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INTRODUCTION
Public interest law (“PIL”) remains in a state of perpetual crisis
today. The legal needs of the poor and underrepresented dramatically
outstrip the resources of legal aid and civil rights organizations. Legal
aid offices across the country decline half of the requests that they
receive because of insufficient resources, and this does not count the
many people who never seek access to an attorney.1 Low-income
households are able to obtain legal aid for less than 20% of their legal
needs.2 Even when aid programs exist, problems arise because of
failures of coordination.3 Cause-oriented nonprofits, like the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), report working in a legal
and political climate that is increasingly hostile to claims of minority
rights.4 These organizations prioritize only the worst violations of
minority rights.5 As a result, public interest lawyers routinely report
that they pay insufficient attention to many serious violations of rights
because of their limited resources.6
Prominent voices within the organized bar increasingly recognize
the failure of the legal profession to provide meaningful access to
justice.7 When individual legal needs go unaddressed and systematic
violations of civil rights go without response, these voices agree that

1. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 9-12 (2009). There is
one legal aid lawyer for every 6,415 low-income people in the U.S., compared with one
lawyer for every 429 people in the general population. See id. at 19.
2. See id. at 13–18 (discussing unmet legal need by household).
3. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA:
FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT 21 (2011) (“At
the national level and within most states, civil legal assistance is organized much like a body
without a brain: it has many operating parts, but no guiding center”).
4. See Scott L. Cummings, The Future of Public Interest Law, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 355, 367–69 (2011) (discussing conservatism); see also David Luban, Taking
Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
209 (2003) (arguing that efforts to de-fund public interest law are part of broader
conservative political assault).
5. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 2027, 2053 (2008) (reporting on strategic decision-making at PILOs).
6. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public
Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 85–88 (2014) (finding that funding restrictions limit the ability of
PILOs to pursue certain claims).
7. See Scott L. Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change: What is the
Field? What Are the Questions?, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 171, 174–75 (2013) (describing
convergence of attention on problems of access to justice).
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the legal profession is failing in its stated professional obligations.8
Over the past decade, organizations including the Department of
Justice, the American Bar Association, the American Bar Foundation,
the Legal Services Corporation, and the Stanford Center on the Legal
Profession have studied the problem of access to justice.9 While these
reports focus on different questions and use different methodologies,
they all point to a severe lack of knowledge about the actual
organization of public interest law as a fundamental challenge to
developing reform proposals.10 These organizations uniformly agree on
the importance of more research on the delivery of public interest law
to inform ongoing debates over how to improve access to justice.11 In
particular, several key studies agree that “how public interest law is
financed affects the kinds of cases that can be pursued and their likely
social impact. A deeper understanding of financial constraints and
opportunities in different practice contexts is therefore critical to
effective reform.”12
This article answers the call for more research on the organization
of public interest law. It provides the first comprehensive study of
individual donors.13 The modern public interest legal organization
(“PILO”) relies heavily on foundations and individual donors.14 But
studying donors directly is difficult because it requires gaining access
8. See id.
9. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH (2013) (Consortium on Access to Justice Report); SANDEFUR
& SMYTH, supra note 3.
10. RHODE, supra note 9, at 532–33. According to one recent study, the lack of
research on legal aid is at least partially due to high costs and low rewards for legal scholars.
See id. at 542–44.
11. See SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 3, at ix (emphasizing lack of previous data);
Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights From Theory
and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 605 (2009) (emphasizing “the importance of
systematic evaluation” to improve public interest litigation); Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca
L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We Know—and Should Know—About American
Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 85 (2013) (identifying “New Measurement”
movement in research on pro bono).
12. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 605. See also Albiston & Nielsen, supra
note 6, at 88–92 (comparing funding models and PILO structures based on random sample
of all PILOs); Rhode 2008, supra note 5, at 2053–58 (discussing sources of funding based
on study of major PILOs); Scott L. Cummings & Ann Southworth, Between Profit and
Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 183 (Robert
Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009) (arguing that the need to make a profit constrains
private firms based on study of hybrid private-public firms); Scott L. Cummings, The
Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 116–34 (2004) (revealing how big firm pro bono
programs focus on cases that will not create conflicts for the firm).
13. To the best of my knowledge, no previous research reports on direct surveys of
donors.
14. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2054.
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to them. PILOs invest substantial resources in maintaining donor
relations and place high priority on maintaining donor privacy.15 They
are understandably reluctant to give researchers access to their donor
lists.16 In lieu of direct access to donors, past research has focused on
the PILOs themselves.17 This research highlights the ongoing tension
between achieving organizational priorities and retaining donors.18
PILO leaders largely agree that, at least in theory, strategic priorities
should be independent of donor preferences.19 Nonetheless, they admit
that donor preferences have at least some impact on which of their
priorities they can work on.20 Donor preferences also can affect causeoriented PILOs in more subtle ways. For example, the need for
measurable outcomes to present to donors can inhibit work on more
complex problems with less discrete solutions. Grassroots organizing
and coalition building can also suffer when they are not as visible as
high profile litigation. Finally, PILOs might duplicate some efforts as
they race to achieve the same goals and attract the same donors.
Because of the multiple ways that donors could influence public
interest law, any full discussion of the future of the industry requires
more insight into donor motivations.
I surveyed donors to the National Center for Lesbian Rights
(NCLR) as part of a broader research project on the history of the
major Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) legal
organizations.21 In this article, I present two central findings from the
survey. (1) Most donors draw clear distinctions between NCLR and its
sister organizations.22 But donors vary in what distinctions they
consider important and how they describe NCLR. NCLR is variously
described as an LGBT organization, a lesbian feminist organization,
and a social justice organization. (2) Donor interests are complex and
contradictory.23 Most donors see NCLR as promoting some version of

15. See infra Part II (discussing challenges to accessing donors for this article).
16. In addition to privacy concerns, PILOs also avoid soliciting donor feedback too
frequently.
17. See Rhode 2008, supra note 5; see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6.
18. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2052–53 (emphasizing conflict from point of view of
PILO leaders); see also Roger Alan Stone, The Mass Plaintiff: Public Interest Law, Direct
Mail Fundraising and the Donor/Client, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 197, 235–37 (1992)
(discussing historic examples of tension between donors and cause-oriented PILOs).
19. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2052 (“Conservative as well as liberal groups were
committed to having strategy drive funding, not the other way around”) (internal quotations
omitted).
20. See id. at 2052-53.
21. See infra Part III (describing research).
22. See infra Part IV.B (reporting on survey results of NCLR’s reputation with donors).
23. See infra Part IV.C (identifying contradictory ways that donors describe goals and
priorities).
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their interests. However, they do not expect NCLR to adhere to a
narrow understanding of their self-interest. Donors have a more
nuanced understanding of public interest law than is sometimes
imagined. They expect NCLR to continue to pursue and build upon its
core goals, even when those goals are personally less important to
them. They are also more supportive of new work that is seen as in line
with NCLR’s existing core goals. The challenge for NCLR is that
donors do not all agree on what the core goals are.
These findings have important implications for what work gets
funded. As past research suggests, some issues and cases drive more
donor support than other issues. Visibility is particularly important in
this respect. NCLR donors might expect and reward the organization
for its critical work on issues like racial and economic justice, but they
also primarily expect the organization to do more visible “mainstream”
LGBT rights. I argue that these findings offer organizations tools for
building donor engagement and support for a broader range of work.
Visibility is a malleable wedge, and organizations can expand donor
support for key issues by educating and interacting with donors to
increase their understanding. These findings help us address questions
relevant to the broader project of building the PIL industry: How do
donors understand “public interest”? Do their interests align with other
key stakeholders in the PIL industry? How can cause-oriented PILOs
expand their donor support? How can donor interests be used to
promote cooperation rather than competition across the PIL industry?
Past research underscores the importance of studying donors to
PILOs. Most importantly, scholars routinely argue that funding sources
affect the delivery of public interest law.24 The PIL industry includes
lawyers in both nonprofit and private practice settings.25 On the
nonprofit side, public interest includes cause-oriented PILOs and legal
aid to the poor.26 On the private side, it includes pro bono services and
hybrid private-public firms.27 The meaning and goals of “public
interest law” in these different sites is largely shaped by the different
sources of funding that they rely upon.28 Based on this mosaic of public
interest law, scholars argue that reform efforts must include the whole
24. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6.
25. Sometimes government lawyers, including those in the Department of Justice or
Public Defender’s offices, are included in the PIL industry. See Scott L. Cummings, The
Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 506, 526 (2012) (diagramming PIL
industry).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Cf. Scott L. Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
4, 7–8, 34 (2012) (identifying how necessity of generating profit shapes meaning of public
interest in private plaintiff-side firms).
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industry.29 Public interest is an umbrella that includes somewhat
divergent goals: legal aid to the poor, social justice, civil rights, cause
advocacy, and professional obligations of individual lawyers.30
Different sites of public interest law are better suited to these various
goals.31 Any comprehensive reform proposals need to address the
structure of the industry as a whole.32 In order to make meaningful
comparisons, we need to understand how all the relevant stakeholders
interact.33 Cause-oriented PILOs are considered the most able to
engage in large-scale impact litigation.34 This article confirms this
flexibility, but identifies informal constraints imposed on PILOs by
donors. By filling this gap in our knowledge, this article contributes to
future efforts to improve access to justice and the delivery of public
interest law.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I surveys the history and
present structure of public interest law, showing how it has changed
over time. While this article focuses on cause-oriented nonprofits, it is
important to understand the differences in public interest law as it
operates in government-funded legal aid, hybrid private-public firms,
and pro bono. Understanding these other sites is important to this
article for two reasons. First, by identifying the restrictions on these
other sites, the article identifies what legal needs are not being met. To
the extent that we think these unmet legal needs are best served by
donor-funded nonprofits, we need to understand donor preferences.
Second, services are most effective when they are coordinated across
organizations. Cause-oriented nonprofits refer cases to legal aid offices
and private firms. They also frequently co-counsel cases with private
firms or with pro bono support.
Part II introduces key concerns raised in ongoing reform proposals
aimed at improving the PIL industry. This Part focuses on concerns
over how to balance the demands of community accountability with the
traditional role of the lawyer. It also discusses proposals for expanding
the number of lawyers involved in public interest work. Parts I and II
identify several key concerns that the remainder of the article will
address, including time spent on fundraising, accountability, and
29. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 637-51 (identifying potential reforms
across different public interest practice sectors).
30. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 619–28 (describing goals of different
sectors of PIL industry).
31. Id.
32. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 88–92 (evaluating different funding
models in context of structure of whole PIL industry).
33. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2076.
34. See infra Part I (discussing development of PIL industry and constraints on
different industry sectors).
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potential cooperation and competition between PILOs.
Part III introduces the survey and its results. It includes a detailed
discussion of survey methods and a demographic and charitable-giving
profile of respondents. The survey included a mix of open and closedended questions asking about donors’ personal preferences, reasons for
supporting NCLR, and comparing NCLR to other organizations.
Part IV analyzes the responses to these questions. These findings
support the article’s core arguments that donor preferences are complex
and not easily reduced to self-interest. This analysis also shows that
donors describe NCLR as an LGBT rights organization, a lesbian
feminist organization, and a social justice organization. To NCLR’s
staff, these identities are mutually constitutive—each one is a necessary
part of what the organization does—but donors may prioritize one or
more of these identities over others.
Part V builds on this analysis by identifying lessons for causeoriented PILOs. In particular, this Part argues that donor engagement
can be a powerful tool to increase community accountability.
Ultimately, this article cannot answer the question of whether the
donor-funded model is the best way to promote social-justice
lawyering. Largely, this question misses the point. Achieving
meaningful social justice will require harnessing the possibilities
offered by different sites of public interest law. This article probes the
pitfalls and opportunities of the donor-funded PILO.
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF PIL INDUSTRY
This article shows how donor preferences affect the politics of
public interest. It grapples with big questions of whether and how
donors constrain the work of cause-oriented PILOs. Before getting into
those important issues, we need some background on the history and
structure of the industry. What we see today is a larger and more
sophisticated PIL industry than ever before. Individual organizations
have grown and professionalized, the number and types of
organizations has grown, and the sources of funding have grown. But
much of this funding comes with restrictions on the types of work that
PILOs can do. Many of the key battles in the development of the PIL
industry have been related to tensions over what work should get
funded first, and what work should get funded at all.
A. History of Modern PIL Industry
The tension between the interests of funders and public interest
lawyers predates the modern PIL industry. Long before the ACLU and
NAACP became household names, their leaders fretted over how to
remain true to their radical goals while also attracting the support of
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donors to fund their work.35 When they were founded in the early years
of the 20th century, they had little precedent for how to use litigation to
support a major social movement.36 Through their early decades, both
organizations struggled with limited resources and hostility from the
organized bar.37 As they secured more reliable funding, they developed
into organizations that could support long-term impact litigation
campaigns. Their funding shaped their work in important ways. In the
case of the NAACP, major grants enabled the development of the
organization’s famous campaign to end school desegregation.38 While
important for the organization’s growth, these grants also had the effect
of limiting resources available for other legal strategies.39 At the
ACLU, internal debates pitted free speech purists against those who
would refuse support to Communists and the Ku Klux Klan.40 ACLU
lawyers leaned towards an absolute vision of freedom of speech, taking
controversial cases on behalf of unpopular speakers.41 But they
sometimes took these cases on narrow grounds, and the ACLU
struggled to retain members who disagreed with its positions.42
Eventually, however, the ACLU became a national organization as it
attracted more members based on its willingness to take these tough
cases.43
Even after the ACLU and NAACP succeeded as established
PILOs, they remained exceptional until the 1960s. The first organized
legal aid offices in the United States opened in the late nineteenth and

35. See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 218–21 (1976) (tracing ACLU and NAACP roles in history of
public interest law).
36. Id.
37. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU (1999) (history of ACLU funding challenges); Cummings, supra note 28, at 11–19
(history of hostility by the organized bar).
38. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987). Explaining the same shift to school desegregation, Risa
Goluboff, details how cases on behalf of labor and unions became less attractive as the
NAACP focused on doctrinal opportunities for school desegregation cases. See Risa
Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself”: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and
the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1455–59 (2005).
39. See TUSHNET, supra note 38, at 1-20 (describing early development of school
segregation campaign and shift away from issues including economic empowerment, mob
violence, and criminal justice).
40. See WALKER, supra note 37, at 115–19.
41. In the 1940s, the ACLU did take an official anti-Communist position. See id. at
130. By 1954, it reversed this position. See id. at 208–14.
42. See id. at 115–214 (detailing the ACLU’s successful debates within the ACLU
between 1933 and 1954, including compromises and members lost).
43. See id. at 330 (discussing the ACLU’s successful fundraising following its
controversial defense of a Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois).
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early twentieth centuries.44 These offices were small, typically funded
by local communities.45 They provided legal services to at least some
people who could not otherwise afford them, but they did not address
larger policy issues.46 Public interest, at this time, meant case-by-case
charity on behalf of needy clients. Along with these local legal aid
offices, the ACLU, and NAACP, individual lawyers practiced what
might be called public interest law.47 Through a mix of charity and forprofit cases, these lawyers supported poor and underrepresented
communities with legal services.
New sources of funding in the 1960s spurred the growth of a
public interest law industry, transforming the ad hoc activity of
individual lawyers into a web of new organizations.48 Most
importantly, the Federal Legal Services Program was established in
1965 through the Office of Economic Opportunity.49 With this massive
infusion of federal funding, legal services offices spread across the
country and began to attract highly credentialed lawyers who addressed
the problems of the poor as a group.50 In the early years of the federal
program, funding “explicitly went beyond providing basic legal
services to seek systematic law reform on behalf of the poor.”51
The Ford Foundation played an equally critical role in the growth
of the public interest law industry. Initially, the Foundation invested in
community legal aid offices.52 By 1970, it expanded its grant-giving
focus to include cause-oriented PILOs.53 Taking the ACLU and
44. See JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 34 (1982); Albiston &
Nielsen, supra note 6, at 63–64.
45. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 64.
46. See id.
47. Kenneth Mack argues that when we tell the history of civil rights based on lawyers
who worked at the NAACP, we miss the long history of individual black lawyers who
struggled to create a professional identity as civil rights lawyers. See KENNETH W. MACK,
REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 6–9 (2012); See
Albiston and Nielsen, supra note 6, at 64.
48. See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 42
(Burton A. Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler & Neil K. Komesar eds., 1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW] (conceptualizing “public interest law” as an industry); Rabin, supra note
35, at 224–36 (comparing public interest law movement of the 1970s with earlier law reform
efforts); see also Cummings, supra note 25, at 508; Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Law:
Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 417, 417–19 (2011).
49. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 64–65.
50. See KATZ, supra note 44 at 65–67 (describing shift from low-status “legal aid”
lawyers who provided a “day-in-court” to the poor to higher-status “legal services” lawyers
who addressed systemic policy issues affecting the poor); Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6,
at 65 (explaining that legal services offices eventually served almost every county in the
U.S.).
51. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 65.
52. See id. at 64–65.
53. See id. at 65.
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NAACP as models, Ford funded a range of new organizations, each
with a small legal staff committed to impact litigation to advance a
specific cause.54 Finally, Ford funded several key studies of public
interest law. Focusing on themes of social justice, unmet legal aid,
ethical obligations of the organized bar, and economic viability, these
studies provided the intellectual framework to support the emergent
industry.55 By the close of the 1970s, PILOs became an
institutionalized feature of the American legal profession.56
Since then, the growth of public interest law has been tremendous.
No exact figures on the size of the public interest legal industry are
available, but rough estimates are possible. A ground-breaking 1975
study surveyed the legal profession at the time to demonstrate that the
public interest legal organization occupied a defined niche.57 This study
identified eighty-six public interest legal organizations.58 Using a
similar definition of public interest legal organization, another study of
the PIL industry in 2000 estimated that there were slightly over 1,000
organizations.59 Because neither study attempted to identify every
PILO,60 these figures are not directly comparable. Nonetheless, they
illustrate the dramatic growth in the industry over the past several
decades.
54. See id. (Ford Foundation role in growth of PIL industry); Rabin, supra note 35, at
228-29 (variety and characteristics of organizations funded by Ford Foundation); Ann
Southworth, What is Public Interest Law?: Empirical Perspectives on an Old Question, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 496-97 (2013) (ACLU and NAACP as “earlier models” for new PIL
field).
55. There were at least five key studies. See FORD FOUNDATION, PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: FIVE YEARS LATER (1976); JOEL F. HANDLER, ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH &
HOWARD S. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); GORDON
HARRISON & SANFORD M. JAFFE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM: NEW VOICES FOR
NEW CONSTITUENCIES (1973); PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 48; Rabin, supra note
35, at 228–329, 236; see also Trubek, supra note 42, at 418–19 (arguing that these studies
provided the intellectual justification for the PILO).
56. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 63–71 (discussing history of public
interest law). Scott Cummings argues that the Ford Foundation and the federal legal
services program “transformed” the public interest law movement. See Cummings, supra
note 4, at 355.
57. See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 48, at 49-60. This study was not meant to
identify every PILO in existence at the time.
58. See id. at 50.
59. Nielsen and Albiston identified 4,588 organizations that potentially met their
definition of public interest legal organization. More detailed research on a random sample
of 1,200 of these organizations found that 22.5% actually met their definition of public
interest legal organization. Based on this rate, they estimated a little over 1,000
organizations. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public
Interest Practice: 1975-2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1605–06 n. 65 (2006).
60. Even with adequate resources, this task would be near impossible because of
disagreements over exactly which organizations should count. See id. at 1601–03; see also
Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 605–06 (discussing definition of “public interest”).
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As the industry grew, it also shifted. Comparing the results of the
1975 and 2000 studies, Nielsen and Albiston identified several key
changes in the industry. First, organizations were larger on average in
2000, employing more attorneys and total staff and having larger
operating budgets.61 Second, by 2000, PILOs adopted modern
management techniques including larger support staffs relative to their
legal departments.62 Third, PILOs in 1975 were more likely to work on
single issues but by 2000 were more likely to work on multiple issues
and provide multiple services.63 Finally, in 2000, more PILOs relied
heavily on government funding for their organizational budgets.64 This
funding came with increased restrictions on the activities of PILOs.
When Congress created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974,
it ensured the survival of federal funding for legal aid to the poor but
simultaneously began restricting how those funds could be used.65 The
Reagan administration further restricted LSC-funded organizations
from engaging in any form of political advocacy.66 By 1996, Congress
further restricted what kinds of cases LSC funds could be used for.67
These restrictions prevented LSC-funded organizations from taking
class actions and other high-impact cases, and also curtailed their
ability to participate in administrative and policy reform. 68 They also
prevented LSC-funded organizations from using any source of funding
for these cases.69 At the same time, courts also began cutting back on
the availability of attorney fees for civil rights cases.70

61. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 59, at 1606.
62. Id. at 1608.
63. Id. at 1615.
64. Id. at 1616-17.
65. The Nixon Administration dismantled most of the OEO, but legal aid survived
because of pressure from the organized bar. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 65; see
also A. W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 22–30 (2007); Earl Johnson,
Justice and Reform: A Quarter Century Later, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID:
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 9 (Francis Reagan et al., eds., 1999), for more
historical depth.
66. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 66.
67. These new restrictions included a ban on representing aliens or incarcerated people,
as well as prohibitions on class action lawsuits or participation in administrative rule
making. See Luban, supra note 4, at 221.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1087 (2007) (finding that judicial attacks on attorney fees have restricted what cases
are brought). In addition to restricting when fees were available, courts increasingly
allowed defendants to include a waiver of fees in a settlement offer. These waivers defeat
the purpose of the attorney fees statutes and create divergent interests between attorneys and
their clients. See Luban, supra note 4, at 241–45.
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B. Public Interest Law Inside Cause-Oriented Nonprofits
When Ford and other funders turned to cause-oriented public
interest law in the 1970s, they used the ACLU and the NAACP as
models of successful public interest organizations.71 Based on these
models, the new organizations focused on elite-led, impact litigation
strategies.72 As more organizations claimed to be “public interest,” the
label was increasingly seen as a way to legitimate work on behalf of a
cause or a group of people.73 This growth of public interest law was
embedded in the broader contemporaneous explosion of the nonprofit
sector.74 Nonprofits were increasingly involved in the delivery of social
services that were previously the domain of the government.75 By the
1980s, conservative and libertarian organizations began to label
themselves as public interest law firms.76 Today, PILOs work on an
ever-expanding number of issues.77 Because these cause-oriented
organizations focus directly on changing social policy, they are often
considered the core of the public interest movement.78
These nonprofits receive most of their support from foundation
grants and individual contributions. In a survey of major public interest
legal organizations, Deborah Rhode found that foundation support and
individual contributions make up the bulk of their income.79
71. See Rabin, supra note 35, at 228–31; Trubek, supra note 42, at 417–19.
72. See Thomas Miguel Hilbink, Constructing Cause Lawyering: Professionalism,
Politics, and Social Change in 1960s America (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University) (on file with author).
73. See Ann Southworth, What is Public Interest Law?: Empirical Perspectives on an
Old Question, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (2013).
74. See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary
Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 32 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg
eds., 2006).
75. See id.
76. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION 10–14 (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008) (telling history of conservative public interest
law).
77. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2032–33.
78. Cf. id. at 2029-32 (justifying survey focus on “the nation’s leading public interest
legal organizations”).
79. See id. at 2054. Rhode studied “nonprofit tax-exempt groups that attempt[ed] to
use law to achieve social objectives.” She included “the nation’s largest and wellrecognized public interest legal organizations,” along with a sample of smaller
organizations. 51 of 57 organizations that she contacted participated in the survey. Id. at
2029–30. In their more comprehensive study of the PIL field, Albiston and Nielsen
similarly identify the importance of foundation grants and individual contributions but find
that government funding provides the largest share of organizational budgets. Albiston &
Nielsen, supra note 6, at 76–77. This difference reflects the role of federal legal services
funding. Poverty organizations were far more likely than others to accept Legal Services
Corporation funding and to rely on federal funding for a substantial percent of their budget.
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Foundation support accounted for a mean of 37% of organizational
budgets and individual contributions were 28%. For over half of the
organizations (58%), individual contributions made up at least 40% of
their budget.80 These statistics likely underestimate the importance of
individual donors to the operation of nonprofit PILOs. The foundation
grants that make up a slightly larger percentage of their budget also
typically come with more limitations than individual donations.81
Foundations typically refuse to fund ongoing operating expenses,
preferring new issues and new projects.82 Demands for accountability
metrics often steer foundations away from support for complex social
problems, where outcomes are more difficult to measure.83 This
restricts the availability of grant funding for innovative projects that
integrate litigation and other strategies in new and flexible ways.84
Compared to these foundation grants, individual contributions come
with fewer restrictions. PILOs also encourage donors to commit to
recurring donations, explaining that even small monthly donations play
a key role in stabilizing an organization’s budget.85
Because they rely so heavily on foundations and private
contributions, directors of major PILOs report spending an average of
38% of their time on fundraising.86 Directors complain that this is “too
much” time when they compare it to advancing the substantive mission
of their organizations, but they also explain that it is “not enough” time
with respect to the never-ending funding needs of their organizations.87
Attracting donors has become a more fraught process as more
organizations compete for the same dollars.88 One way PILOs respond
to this challenge is by carving out a niche to distinguish themselves
from other similar organizations. Most obviously, NCLR needs to
attract donors who might give to a range of other LGBT legal
organizations.89 In addition, potential NCLR donors might also give to
Id. at 78–80. The most prominent organizations—those that Rhode focused on—tend to
focus on impact litigation.
80. Rhode at p. 2055; Id.
81. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 90 (comparing constraints of foundation
grants with other funding models).
82. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2056–57.
83. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 630–36 (discussing challenges for
public interest presented by use of “measurable outcomes” and pro-business orientation in
corporate giving).
84. See id.
85. Corporate giving and attorneys’ fees, the only other two substantial sources of
funding, are also less consistent and/or come with their own restrictions. See Rhode, supra
note 5, at 2054–58.
86. See id. at 2058.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 2033.
89. See Jeffrey Kosbie, Contested Identities: A History of LGBT Legal Mobilization
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LGBT community or political organizations, as well as organizations
focusing on women’s rights, civil rights, or other similar issues. This
creates a set of twin challenges. PILOs must maintain a consistent
reputation around a set of core principles in order to attract and retain
donors. At the same time, they must continue to innovate and remain
responsive to emerging social issues and donor concerns.90 As Part III
discusses in more detail, NCLR staff can readily explain how they meet
these challenges. What is less clear is how donors perceive the
organization and which other organizations they compare it to.
Within the world of cause-oriented PILOs, there are some
funding-related differences worth noting. Conservative and progressive
PILOs report receiving the same types of funding, but conservative
organizations receive a greater percent of their funding from private
contributions.91 They are less likely to be subject to funding-related
restrictions on class actions, attorney’s fees, and representing
nonindigent clients.92 Conservative organizations are also significantly
less likely to have attorneys funded through outside fellowships.93
These results may have implications for how donor preferences matter.
On the one hand, donor preferences may be more important to
progressive organizations. Private donations potentially offer the least
restricted funding available to these organizations. On the other hand,
donor preferences may present informal restrictions on the work of
conservative organizations. Understanding how these preferences
restrict the work of cause-oriented PILOs is important because they are
not as clearly identified as the formal restrictions in government
funding and foundation grants.
C. Public Interest Law Outside of Cause-Oriented Nonprofits
Along with cause-oriented nonprofits, legal aid, pro bono, and
private public firms make up the public interest law industry.
Nonetheless, “public interest law” takes on different meanings in each
of these settings. Each of these settings depends upon unique
institutional structures. These structures enable certain types of public
and the Ethics of Impact (June 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) (on file with author) (discussing interactions between major LGBT legal
organizations).
90. Cf. Brayden G. King et al., Identity Realization and Organizational Forms:
Differentiation and Consolidation of Identities Among Arizona’s Charter Schools, 22 ORG.
SCI. 554 (2011) (arguing that charter schools must claim to be new and innovative while also
maintaining their identity as charter schools).
91. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 80–81.
92. See id. at 83–84. Conservative organizations are not more likely to be subject to
restrictions on lobbying, however.
93. See id. at 80.
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interest law while inhibiting others. By paying attention to these other
settings and in particular how they differ from cause-oriented
nonprofits, we get a better sense of who the key stakeholders are and
where the gaps are in the public interest law industry.
1. Legal Aid
Before the birth of the contemporary public interest legal
movement, legal aid consisted of small local organizations devoted to
providing legal assistance to the indigent.94 Today, legal aid continues
to primarily include these poverty law organizations. Legal aid offices
offer services in well-defined categories of cases. While the exact
services vary by office, they generally include issues like domestic
violence restraining orders, child custody, eviction defense, housing
conditions, employment discrimination, and access to governmentfunded social services. In addition to poverty law, legal aid includes
nonprofit organizations that provide services to target populations, such
as people with disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, or people
with HIV/AIDS. Even when legal aid providers target specific
populations, they still generally restrict their services based on income
cutoffs.95 Legal aid offices also typically restrict eligibility for services
based on geographic residence.96
When the federal legal services program was created in the 1960s,
it provided the bulk of funding for most of these organizations.97
Federal funding remains important today, but state and local funds
have displaced federal funds as the largest share of their budgets.98 This
stands in contrast to cause oriented nonprofits, which rely more heavily
on private contributions from individual donors and grants.99
While legal aid offices do critical work to represent individual
clients in court, they continue to be woefully underfunded and unable
to meet all of even the “most serious” needs of the unrepresented.100
Moreover, restrictions on their funding prevent them from using many
of the legal tools that cause-oriented PILOs rely on in their work.101 For
94. Supra Part I.A.
95. See id. at 83–84 (explaining that many non poverty law organizations face similar
restrictions on their services).
96. Nielsen and Albiston explain that state and local funding provides the largest share
of these organization’s budgets today. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 59, at 1616.
These local funding sources impose geographic limitations on which clients an organization
can represent.
97. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6 at 64–65.
98. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 59, at 1616.
99. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2054–56.
100. See DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 14.
101. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 6, at 88–92 (comparing restrictions on different
types of PILOs).
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example, legal aid offices could create programs designed to improve
the delivery of legal services to the chronically homeless, but they
could not bring class actions affecting the homeless or participate in
regulatory debates for social services that affect the homeless.102 Thus,
legal services and cause-oriented organizations share goals of access to
justice, but they take very different types of cases to accomplish this
goal. While cause-oriented PILOs evaluate cases based on their
likelihood of setting new precedents that will benefit a broad group of
people, legal services offices focus on the most efficient delivery of
direct services to poor and underrepresented clients.
2. Private Firm Pro Bono
The organized bar in the United States has long had an uneasy
relationship with legal aid.103 Some version of legal aid is consistent
with the classic image of the lawyer as a professional gatekeeper,
protecting the rule of law.104 Competing with this is the image of the
lawyer as a hired gun, advocating for their client’s interests. When seen
as hired gun, the interests of paying clients were often in tension with
demands for legal aid. The creation of the federal legal services
program in the 1960s presented a particularly prominent challenge to
the professional authority of the organized bar to define the terms of
legal aid.105 The American Bar Association offered only tentative
support to the new federal programs.106 As the federal government
began to cut back on legal services in the 1980s, the private bar stepped
in to argue that volunteer-based pro bono programs were an ideal
alternative to government-funded legal aid.107 Private pro bono
programs defined legal aid in narrow terms of volunteer services to
poor clients, rather than through the broader ideologies of access to
justice that defined the early federal legal services program.108 The
institutionalization of voluntary pro bono programs at big firms
allowed the ABA and the organized bar to resist calls for mandatory
pro bono requirements for lawyers.109 Pro bono programs also provided
other benefits to private firms, including recruitment, training, and
retention of top law students; exposing lawyers to new views and

102.
aid).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Cf. Luban, supra note 4, at 221 (detailing government-imposed restrictions on legal
See Cummings, supra note 28, at 11–19 (discussing history).
Id.
See id. at 15–17 (detailing reactions of the organized bar).
See id.
Id. at 18.
See id. at 17–18.
See Cummings, supra note 28, at 31.
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perspectives; and improving the public image of big firms.110
Today, PILOs rely heavily on pro bono assistance from the private
bar. This assistance represents a tremendous resource: the nation’s 200
largest firms reported 4.75 million hours of pro bono assistance in
2014.111 A 2005 study estimated the value of pro bono services at $246
million.112 80% of major PILOs report extensive or moderate reliance
on pro bono assistance.113 In addition to co-counseling cases, PILOs
refer out some cases that they cannot handle themselves.114 However,
pro bono collaborations create particular challenges for PILOs. The
most common challenge is that pro bono volunteers often lack relevant
substantive experience and require more supervision from PILO
staff.115 In addition, associates at private firms may face pressure not to
take certain types of cases—especially employment, environmental, or
consumer cases—or to prioritize work for billable clients over pro bono
cases.116 Finally, private firms sometimes try to claim credit for pro
bono cases.117
Taken together, the evidence confirms that pro bono programs
contribute substantially to the public interest law industry. However,
pro bono is based on a particular understanding of public interest. Pro
bono programs typically equate the “public interest” with free legal
services. The scattershot nature of service delivery and ill-defined
nature of social goals means that these programs might do more to
satisfy individual lawyers’ sense of ethical duties than to achieve
meaningful social justice. More radically, some critics charge that the
legal profession should have an ethical duty to refuse socially unjust
cases on behalf of powerful clients—a duty that the profession avoids
by claiming pro bono programs relieve them of any other

110. See Cummings, supra note 7, at 108–13.
111. See Pro Bono Report 2015: Treading Water, The AMERICAN LAWYER, July 2015,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202730400870/Pro-Bono-Report-2015-TreadingWater.
112. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and Market-Reliant Legal
Aid, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 95, 96–98 (Robert Granfield & Lynn
Mather eds., 2009).
113. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2070.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 2071–72.
116. See Steven A. Boutcher, Lawyering for Social Change: Pro Bono Publico, Cause
Lawyering, and the Social Movement Society, 18 MOBILIZATION 179 (2013); Cummings,
supra note 7, at 116–134 (employment, environmental, and consumer cases often create
conflicts of interest with private firms’ other clients. Even in the absence of formal
conflicts, firms are reluctant to be seen “on the other side” of a business issue.); see also
Rhode, supra note 5, at 2071–72 (discussing from perspective of PILOs seeking pro bono
assistance).
117. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2070–71.
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responsibilities.118
3. Private Public Hybrid Firms
Private involvement in the public interest law industry does not
only take the form of pro bono legal aid. A substantial number of
hybrid private public interest firms also play a key role. These firms
represent plaintiffs in areas including labor and employment,
environmental, consumer protections, securities fraud, and personal
injury. While a commitment to some version of the public interest is
often part of these firms’ stated goals, they also have to make a
profit.119 These firms have grown in response to the demand for legal
aid, providing an alternate economic and professional model to the
nonprofit.120 Lawyers at these hybrid private-public firms typically
have similar backgrounds to their counterparts in nonprofit PILOs, with
individual lawyers often moving between practice settings during their
careers.121 Unlike their counterparts in nonprofits, lawyers at private
firms define their professional identities around traditional professional
norms of legal skill and zealous advocacy.122 Their professional
reputation is defined around being a zealous advocate for individual
clients’ rights, not around systemic change to promote social justice.
These hybrid firms are closer to cause-oriented nonprofit PILOs
than the pro bono programs of big law firms. However, case selection
at private public firms differs from nonprofit PILOs in some key ways.
Most importantly, these firms need to generate a profit.123 They do so
by taking a share of the damages awarded in cases, as well as
attorney’s fees when available.124 While they sometimes take on riskier
cases with no clear profit potential because of their social importance,
they offset risky cases with profit-generating cases that enforce welldefined violations of the law.125 Along with accepting or declining
118. See Russel G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 381 (2001).
119. See Cummings & Southworth, supra note 12, at 184–86. While recognizing the
tension between profit and public interest, some scholars argue that “public interest” should
be defined to include profit-making activity. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to
Do With It?: Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 447–52 (2014)
(criticizing definitions of public interest that treat it as a market exception).
120. See Cummings & Southworth, supra note 12, at 183–84.
121. See id. at 184.
122. See Cummings, supra note 28, at 7-8, 34. Private public firms also offer lawyers
greater autonomy and larger salaries than nonprofits. See id. at 73–74.
123. See id. at 8–9.
124. See id. at 65.
125. A study of one private-public firm found that half of its docket was comprised of
“bread-and-butter” employment lawsuits challenging illegal discrimination or wage-andhour violations, where recovery was more predictable. See id. at 63–66.
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cases at least partially based on their ability to generate profit, private
firms sometimes decline particularly large-scale litigation that will
stretch firm resources too thin.126 Case selection is also driven by a
looser sense of social justice, rather than by a specific cause as at most
nonprofits.127 Thus cases generally need to fit within the social justice
umbrella to be accepted, but they do not need to advance a particular
issue or set of goals. Once cases are accepted, any broader social goals
drop out and case management is entirely client-centered.128 These
features of case selection at private public firms do allow them to take
on many important, precedent-setting cases.129 However, they also
prevent these firms from developing long-term impact litigation
campaigns like their nonprofit counterparts.
II. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PIL INDUSTRY
So far, Part I traced the history and structure of the modern PIL
industry. Part II now turns to existing criticisms and reform proposals.
In particular, this Part focuses on reform proposals dealing with
improving PILO accountability and expanding the size of the PIL
industry. Donors are a key constituency affecting both of these goals.
This Part situates the findings of this article in a broader ongoing
discussion about the role of the PIL industry in promoting access to
justice.
A. Improving PILO Accountability
In the traditional practice of law, lawyers are accountable to their
client. The lawyer’s primary duty is to be a zealous advocate for the
interests of their client.130 But lawyers at cause-oriented PILOs take on
more than just the representation of their individual client. They
identify with their cause and consider themselves accountable to a
broader community.131 Many definitions consider this service to
126. Id. at 67
127. See id. at 35.
128. See Cummings, supra note 28, at 43–47.
129. Private firms have argued key civil rights cases dating back to the early 20th
century. See Cummings & Southworth, supra note 12, at 189.
130. The rules of professional conduct do impose restrictions on the means of
advocating for a client. For example, a lawyer cannot knowingly allow a client to falsely
testify in court. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2013). Within these
ethical constraints, a lawyer is supposed to do everything that they can to advance their
client’s interests. Critics argue that lawyers should have a greater professional duty to
discourage clients from pursuing socially unjust actions. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 118.
131. See Corey S. Shdaimah, Intersecting Identities: Cause Lawyers as Legal
Professionals and Social Movement Actors, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
220, 220, 222 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) (finding that many lawyers
at PILOs identify as activists first and lawyers second).
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broader goals to be the foundation of public interest law. Thus, the
quality of public interest law is measured not only by winning cases for
individual clients but also by advancing the interests of a community.
There are two central questions that emerge with respect to
accountability. First, who should make decisions about litigation
strategy? Second, what mechanisms will promote accountability? Both
of these questions are about the lawyer-client relationship. The
traditional view of legal ethics is that the lawyer should choose the
legal arguments but that the client should make all substantive
decisions about the case. This model does not cleanly fit the world of
cause-oriented public interest lawyers, who are also interested in
broader social causes.132 Should cause-oriented public interest lawyers
also act as social movement leaders, helping to identify appropriate
legal goals for the movements that they support? Should they defer
entirely to the demands of their individual clients? The demands of a
community? How should public interest lawyers define what the
interests of the community even are? An ongoing literature within
public interest law considers these questions. There is broad agreement
on the principle of accountability, but disagreement over what
accountability means and how to measure it. Despite some speculation
on how donors affect accountability, there is little actual data on this
important question.
Derrick Bell identified the concern of accountability and divergent
interests in his seminal 1976 article.133 Bell argued that traditional
models of legal ethics failed to identify potential conflicts between
public interest lawyers and the communities that they represent.134
NAACP lawyers saw school desegregation as the touchstone of
improved educational opportunity for black children. Local
communities, on the other hand, often considered desegregation less
important than increasing resources for their local schools.135 The
132. The problem of accountability plays out differently in other public interest law
sites. See COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOWINCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 28–29 (2009) (finding that
progressive lawyers make different compromises around accountability depending upon the
availability of resources and their relationships with their clients); Ann Southworth,
Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449 (1999) (comparing accountability issues in representation of
individual poor clients and organizations); see also Cummings and Rhode, supra note 11, at
643–46 (arguing for reconceptualization of pro bono that measures its benefits by social
change rather than individual case outcomes).
133. See Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
134. Id.
135. Bell particularly focuses on disagreements over integration and educational quality
in Boston, Detroit, and Atlanta. See id. at 482–87.
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NAACP’s impressive string of court victories assured some degree of
formal legal equality and decrees of integration.136 Bell argued,
however, that this formal legal equality did not translate to educational
improvements for most black children.137 Would a campaign focused
on improving the schools that black children attended have achieved
better educational opportunities than one focused on desegregation?
Should the NAACP lawyers have been the ones to make that decision?
At its most extreme, Bell’s argument might be taken to be that
prominent civil rights lawyers objectives (desegregation) ran counter to
those of the communities that they represented (educational quality).
Later research paints a more nuanced picture of these
accountability concerns. Even within the NAACP, lawyers did not all
agree on whether to focus on desegregation or educational quality.
NAACP lawyers in Atlanta were more willing to compromise on
desegregation, taking a pragmatic approach to civil rights that they
thought would provide more tangible benefits to the local black
community.138 Similarly, lawyers at other major cause-oriented PILOs
frequently disagree on legal goals and strategies.139 As with the
NAACP, much of this disagreement is about accountability: what the
community wants and how to achieve that. Moreover, these debates do
not only take place inside the walls of nonprofit PILOs. Disagreements
over accountability and professional obligations also spill out to the
broader legal profession.
Outside the NAACP, individual black lawyers struggled with
reconciling the goals of civil rights and the professional expectations of
the legal profession.140 Accountability issues also arise as lawyers
engage with social movements. PILOs frequently enter coalitions with
non-legal social movements and community organizations.141 How they
arrange these coalitions and the role of the PILO in the coalition varies
widely.142 Non-lawyer social movement activists also debate the law on
their own, pushing back against the decisions of cause-oriented public
136. Id.
137. See id. at 515-16.
138. See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 358–60, 431–42 (2011) (arguing that NAACP
lawyers in Atlanta adopted a pragmatic approach to civil rights in contrast to the national
office).
139. See Kosbie, supra note 89 (describing dissent between lawyers at the major LGBT
legal organizations).
140. See MACK, supra note 47 (highlighting stories of individual lawyers).
141. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2067–69.
142. See Anna-Maria Marshall, Social Movement Strategies and the Participatory
Potential of Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 164 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) (describing different relations between lawyers and
communities).
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interest lawyers.143 Across multiple PILOs, movements, and time
periods, accountability remains a central concern of public interest
lawyers. However, it emerges in a wider variety of forms than simple
divergence between elite lawyers and the communities that they
represent.
In addition to interest divergence, the funding of public interest
law can create accountability concerns. These concerns are not unique
to public interest law. The Model Professional Rules of Conduct
include the provision that a lawyer must not accept payment from a
third party if it will influence the lawyer’s professional judgment in a
case.144 In the context of public interest law, these conflicts arise in
several ways.145 Most relevant to this article, the preferences of donors
and grant-making agencies can conflict with the goals of a PILO.146
Legal ethics prevent public interest lawyers from following donor
preferences over client wishes in specific litigation. But legal ethics do
not prevent a PILO from choosing which cases to take, which plaintiffs
to represent, which lawyers to hire, or which programs to develop
based on donor preferences. Directors of major cause-oriented
organizations admit to facing precisely this kind of pressure from
donors.147
Many scholars writing about accountability issues have suggested
strategies to address and minimize the consequences of divergent
interests.148 More radical critiques reject the possibility that the
traditional model of public interest law can ever be accountable to the
communities it is supposed to benefit.149 Central to these criticisms is
the claim that the elite-dominated practice of public interest law diverts
143. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 767 (2010) (arguing that student sit-ins were based on students’
understandings of constitutional law); but see Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to
Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667
(2014) (finding that social movement organizations are largely responsive to media
coverage of PILO activity).
144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. (2013).
145. PILOs often rely on attorney’s fees for at least part of their work. When fees are
only available for certain types of work, are capped at a certain amount, or are included in a
settlement agreement, the lawyer’s interest in fees can diverge from the client’s interest in
representation. See Luban, supra note 4, at 241–45.
146. See Stone, supra note 18, at 235–37.
147. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2056–58.
148. See Cummings, supra note 25, at 525–48 (tracing development of more complex
PILOs that address some of these concerns); Richard Abel, State, Market, Philanthropy and
Self-Help as Legal Services Delivery Mechanisms, in PRIVATE LAWYERS IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 295, 301–06
(Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009) (comparing how the market, self-help,
philanthropic activity, and state aid respond to community concerns).
149. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 1–10 (1992).
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resources from grassroots efforts and disempowers communities.150
Moreover, judicial victories fail to create meaningful change on the
ground and may even harm the communities they are supposed to
benefit.151 Using terms like rebellious lawyering,152 community
lawyering,153 and critical lawyering,154 critics have developed a new
model of lawyering that emphasizes community empowerment as its
central goal.155 Decision-making is collaborative, and the public
interest lawyer uses their understanding of the law and politics to
facilitate grassroots efforts.156 Rather than using the traditional tools of
law reform, community lawyering suggests an ethics of disobedience to
a legal structure that perpetuates inequality.157
Some authors take this criticism a step further and reject the
viability of the nonprofit organizational model.158 These critics argue
that nonprofits necessarily put decision making in the hands of the elite
150. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994);
Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1363 (1993) (illustrating
how community lawyering empowers clients in a way that traditional public interest law
does not); Michael Grinthal, Power with: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 31 (2011) (arguing that even successful impact litigation
leaves communities as marginalized as they were before).
151. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (arguing that judicial victories
often generate social and political backlash); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 336–43 (2008) (identifying constraints on
the role of the judiciary in social change); DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE
VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 19–27 (arguing that formal
legal equality does little to address structural inequality); URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL
EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY & LESBIAN LIBERATION 4–6 (1995) (describing
victories as creating an illusory “virtual equality”).
152. See LOPEZ, supra note 149.
153. See Ancheta, supra note150.
154. See Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Practice,
1 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991).
155. For applications of the community lawyering model to other contexts, see Sammer
M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008) (law
school clinics); Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to Democracy,
11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249 (2004) (prisons); Marc Tizoc González, Cluster
Introduction: Education and Pedagogy: Counter-Disciplinartiy in the Critical Education
Tradition in LatCrit Theory, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 107 (2009) (LatCrit legal theory);
Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 147 (2000) (poverty); Stephanie Tai, Environmental Hazards and the Richmond
Laotian American Community: A Case Study in Environmental Justice, 6 ASIAN L.J. 189
(1999) (environmental justice).
156. See Milner S. Ball, Power from the People, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1725 (1994).
157. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Fidelity to Community: A Defense of Community
Lawyering, 89 TEX. L. REV. 635, 637–39 (2012) (contrasting the traditional ethical
imperative of fidelity to the law with the community lawyering imperative of fidelity to
community).
158. See Dean Spade, Trans Law Reform Strategies, Co-Optation, and the Potential for
Transformative Change, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 288, 299 (2008).
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rather than the socially marginalized.159 The funding sources for
nonprofits are seen as particularly problematic. Critics assume that
nonprofit cause-oriented PILOs will pursue a narrow range of issues in
order to attract the attention of foundations and individual donors.160
How accurate is this assumption? Part III of this article challenges the
characterization of donors’ interests as drawing nonprofits away from
the community that they serve. Donor preferences do create some
problems of accountability. Visibility is particularly important to many
donors. But donor interests are not monolithic. Many donors are deeply
invested in a broad range of social justice issues that affect a broad
range of the community. Donors are active members of the
communities that cause-oriented PILOs represent, and deeper
engagement with them offers opportunities for accountability and
community education. Thus while traditional cause-oriented PILOs
cannot engage in the sort of grassroots mobilization that community
lawyering demands, their criticisms are overstated.
B. Increasing the Number of Public Interest Lawyers
In addition to increased funding, growth in the PIL industry
depends upon increasing the number of lawyers interested in providing
public interest law. These proposals focus on expanding the pipeline
for new lawyers. They play hand-in-hand with more traditional
proposals that focus on increased federal and state funding for legal
aid, decreased restrictions on government aid, increased availability of
attorney’s fees in civil rights cases, and better measurement and
reporting of pro bono in private firms.
Law schools are increasingly investing resources in providing
training and opportunities for public interest law.161 Nonetheless,
pathways into private practice remain far easier to access. As a result,
many students give up on public interest aspirations during their law
school careers.162 Some of these students will take jobs in the public
interest sector later in their careers, but many will remain in private
practice.163 Addressing this law school pipeline for new public interest
lawyers will improve both the quantity and quality of public interest
law by encouraging more, highly-skilled lawyers to participate.
159. Id. at 299-301.
160. See id. at 301–02.
161. See Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training and Placing Public Interest
Law Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1566-69 (2002).
162. See id. at 1566.
163. See RONIT DINOVITZER, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, AFTER THE JD:
FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 54 (2004) (finding that three
years after entering the job market, less than half of new lawyers had any job changes and
lawyers at the largest law firms had the fewest changes).
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Mechanisms that facilitate the pathway into private practice
include summer associateships, easy access to career counseling and on
campus interviewing, and strong alumni networks. In addition, law
schools fail to provide adequate training in the skills required for public
interest law. Law school clinics provide the primary training
mechanism for public interest law. In 2013–14, law schools reported an
average of seven clinics per school.164 Over half of law schools
reported that demand for clinics has gone up over the past three years,
and 58.5% of law school clinics had fewer spots than students seeking
access.165 Increasing clinic availability, career counseling, and other
public interest career support services would make the pathway to
public interest law easier for law students.
Pipeline issues also emerge as law students enter the job market.
Law students who survive law school with their public interest
commitment intact may face a shortage of entry-level jobs in public
interest law. Training entry-level lawyers is particularly challenging for
PILOs, given their funding challenges.166 In addition, graduating law
students face financial pressure to take higher paying private-sector
jobs. In 2014, the National Association for Law Placement found that
the median entry-level public interest salary was $46,000 compared to
a median of $125,000 at private firms.167 These differences are
particularly stark for graduates of top law schools, who typically face
both higher debts and the promise of larger salaries in private
practice.168 Given these pressures, many graduates who enter private
practice report that the ability to pay-off educational debt played a role
in their career decision.169 However, new public interest lawyers report
debt levels equal to or greater than lawyers in other practice settings.170
164. ROBERT R. KUEHN & DAVID A. SANTACROCE, 2013–14 SURVEY OF APPLIED
LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (2015).
165. Id. at 13, 18 (noting 54% of law schools had increased demand and only 12% had
decreased demand).
166. External fellowships for new public interest lawyers help alleviate some of these
startup costs. The more prominent national fellowships include the Skadden and Equal
Justice Works Fellowships.
167. Compare NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 2014 PUBLIC SECTOR AND PUBLIC
INTEREST ATTORNEY SALARY REPORT (2015), with NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT,
2014 ASSOCIATE SALARY SURVEY (2015).
168. Gita Z. Wilder, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, LAW SCHOOL DEBT AMONG
NEW LAWYERS 13–15 (2007) (comparing debt and median salaries by school ranking);
Ronit Dinovitzer, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 44 (2004) (comparing salaries by practice setting
and school ranking). Despite these salary pressures, graduates of top law schools make up
the majority of new public interest lawyers. See id.
169. See Wilder, supra note 168, at 18 (finding that lawyers in private practice rank
salary to pay off debt as more important than lawyers in other settings).
170. See id. at 16–17. Loan Repayment Assistance Programs help alleviate some of this
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While this suggests that debt-to-salary ratios do not deter many
graduates who are committed to public interest, debt burden may be a
greater concern for new lawyers who are starting families and/or who
live in expensive geographic locations.171 Taken together, the evidence
suggests that debt and salary levels may impact who chooses to pursue
a career in public interest law, but that there is no simple relationship
between debt and salary requirements.172
While the pipeline for new public interest lawyers is peripheral to
this article’s core concerns with donor preferences, I raise it here to
make the point that addressing the larger issues of access to justice
requires taking into account multiple stakeholders. Donors play a key
role in shaping the public interest world that new lawyers will enter.
Future work on how to expand opportunities for lawyers to get
involved in public interest work should more explicitly consider how to
engage donors.
III. SURVEY DESIGN
Given what we know about the challenges facing the PIL industry,
particularly with respect to funding, it is surprising how little we know
about the role of donors in funding cause-oriented PILOs. In response,
this article introduces data from an original survey of donors to the
National Center for Lesbian Rights. The survey was completed in
August 2014 as part of a larger research project on the history and
development of the major LGBT legal organizations.173 The larger
project included interviews with over seventy-five LGBT rights
lawyers and activists and data from over 160 boxes of organizational
records.174 During the course of this larger project, NCLR agreed to
distribute a survey to its donors. Two research questions guided the
survey design: (1) How do donors differentiate between different
LGBT legal organizations, and (2) how do donors respond when a
PILO changes its goals and strategies? With an increasing number of
pressure. Loan repayment assistance programs are offered by many law schools, state
governments, and employers.
See
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/loan_repayme
nt_assistance_programs.html. The federal government offers forgiveness of federal loans
for graduates who work in public interest law for over ten years. See id.
171. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2059–62. PILO directors also report only minor
recruiting and retention difficulties related to salary and debt levels. See id.
172. See Wilder, supra note 168, at 19.
173. See Kosbie, supra note 89.
174. For a full list of interviewees, see id. at 325–30. Records were stored in several
locations: publicly available archives, organization’s internal files, and individual lawyer’s
files. For more detail, see id. at 331–34. In addition to interviews and organizational
records, this research also included case law research and other historical research.
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PILOs, more organizations work in any given area and many work in
entirely new areas.175 This proliferation is beneficial insofar as
organizations can specialize and identify unmet legal needs. Working
in coalitions, these organizations can also address larger, more complex
issues. However, this proliferation also means more fighting for
funding and resources.176 PILOs invest substantial time and money in
branding. Similar organizations try to carve out their own niche,
showcasing how they are unique amongst their peers.177 Despite this
branding, it is possible that donors still think of all LGBT rights
organizations as essentially the same.
Initial survey design was completed between August and October
2013. The author worked with NCLR development staff and consulted
past survey research on LGBT populations to develop appropriate
demographic and substantive questions. The final survey (see
Appendix for full text) included closed-ended questions on donor
preferences and perceptions of NCLR. In addition, it included four
open-ended questions asking donors to describe NCLR and its goals.178
After fully vetting and testing the survey, the author worked with
NCLR development staff to finalize survey wording and choose an
appropriate date to distribute the survey.179
NCLR sent an invitation to participate in the survey via email to
all donors who had given in the past thirty-six months.180 They emailed
the initial invitation on August 12, 2014, and emailed a follow-up
invitation on August 27, 2014 to all donors who did not respond to the
first invitation.181 Between these two invitations, 148 donors began the
175. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2033.
176. See id.
177. See Kosbie, supra note 89 (discussing with respect to LGBT rights legal
organizations); see also King, supra note 90 (discussing with respect to nonprofit
organizations in general).
178. Answers to open-ended questions provide richer descriptions and more nuance than
closed-ended questions. They also capture responses that the survey designer may not have
anticipated. Closed-ended questions, on the other hand, create quantifiable data for
comparisons. They force respondents to address specific issues.
179. Several volunteers who were not affiliated with NCLR or with the survey design
team agreed to take test versions of the survey. These test-runs identified minor technical
issues, suggested minor changes to question wording, and confirmed that expected time to
complete the survey was about ten minutes.
180. The survey was designed in Qualtrics online survey software and hosted on
Northwestern University’s servers. NCLR sent an email to its donors with a link to a page
on NCLR’s website describing the survey. From that webpage, donors could click an
anonymous link to take them to the survey. The survey did not collect respondents’ names
or other identifiable information. The author never had access to any donor information.
181. The second invitation went to any donors who did not click on the survey link in
the original email. This includes donors who opened the original email but did not click
through to the survey, but it does not include donors who opened the survey webpage but
did not actually take the survey.
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survey and 103 donors completed all survey questions.182 This equates
to 14% response rate for beginning the survey and a 10% response rate
for completing the survey.183 Unless otherwise indicated, statistics
reported include all collected responses to a given question.
NCLR confirmed that the response rate for this survey was
substantially higher than their normal response for internal donor
feedback.184 Moreover, nothing suggests that preferences and
motivations of survey respondents differ in any meaningful way from
non-respondents. However, respondents are likely more engaged with
NCLR on an ongoing basis. For example, 30% of respondents reported
attending five or more NCLR events in the past three years.185 These
more engaged donors are particularly important to this article’s
argument that cause-oriented PILOs can use donor interactions to
promote greater accountability. Where possible, the article draws
statistical generalizations from the survey data.186 Even where
statistical generalizations are not possible, these data profile a group of
highly engaged donors and are probative of the major concerns driving
their support.187
A. Demographic Profile of Donors
Before launching into an analysis of donor preferences, it is
helpful to have a profile of survey respondents. Overall, respondents
are whiter, more liberal, more educated, have higher incomes, and are
more LGBTQ than the general population. 93% of respondents chose
White as their race.188 Only 2% chose Black, and 4% chose Latino.189
In comparison, 13.3% of the U.S. population is Black and 17.6% is
Latino.190 In California (where many NCLR donors are concentrated),
182. The original solicitation went to about 1,500 donors.
183. The researcher has no data suggesting that respondents differ in any significant
ways from non-respondents.
184. 29% opened the first email invitation, which was substantially better than NCLR’s
typical open-rate of 18%.
185. 19 respondents reported attending 5–10 events, and 10 respondents reported
attending 10 or more events. 98 respondents answered this question.
186. The survey data for this article are based solely on donors to NCLR. There is no
basis to generalize from these data to donors to other cause-oriented PILOs. Given that
many donors to NCLR do also donate to other cause-oriented PILOs, responses to this
survey are probably similar to responses that would be collected at other organizations. See
infra notes 197-211 and accompanying text (discussing where else they donate).
187. The open-ended questions in the survey are particularly important here. Openended questions provide richer data than closed-questions and do not rely on the same sort
of statistical sampling.
188. 91 out of 98 responses to this question. Respondents could choose multiple
responses. Only four respondents chose more than one category for race.
189. 2 out of 98 respondents (Black) and 4 out of 98 (Latino).
190. U.S. CENSUS QUICK FACTS (2015),
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6.5% of the population is Black and 38.8% is Latino.191 Respondents
are far more likely than the general population to have completed
higher education. While only 32% of the general U.S. population has a
B.A. or higher, 94% of survey respondents do.192 Median household
income for respondents was over $150,000.193 Only 11% made at or
below the U.S. median household income of $53,482.194 Respondents
also skew more liberal than the general population, with 50% reporting
their political views as “very liberal,” 38% reporting “liberal,” 12%
reporting “moderate,” and none reporting conservative views.195
Respondents are geographically concentrated in California, near
NCLR’s headquarters in San Francisco. 55% of respondents live in
California, and 38% of respondents live in the San Francisco Bay
Area.196 The remaining respondents are distributed across the entire
U.S. Not surprisingly, donors are also more likely to identify as female
and/or LGBTQ than the general population. 82% of respondents
identify as female, 4% as transgender, 7% as gender nonconforming,
and only 13% as male.197 Similarly, 82% of respondents identify as
lesbian, 11% as gay, 4% as bisexual, 6% as queer, and 6% as
heterosexual.198 Finally, many respondents are actively engaged in
NCLR, beyond just writing a check. 54% of respondents attended at
least one NCLR event in the past three years, with 31% attending three
or more.199 Respondents also follow NCLR’s news. 71% report often
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
191. U.S. CENSUS QUICK FACTS (2015),
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/06,00.
192. In 2014, 31.95% of the general population aged 25 years or older had a Bachelor’s
degree or higher.
See U.S. CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (2015),
https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html. 25 out of 100
respondents have a Bachelor’s degree, 6 have at least some graduate/professional school,
and 63 have a graduate or professional degree. Id.
193. 52% (48 of 93 answering this question) chose the top household income category,
greater than $150,000.
194. Median U.S. household income between 2010 and 2014. See U.S. CENSUS QUICK
FACTS (2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
195. 100 respondents answered this question.
196. Based on zip codes. California residence defined as the range of 900xx-961xx.
Bay Area residence defined as zip codes starting with 94xxx.
197. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Several respondents did choose more
than one category. Of 98 respondents answering this question, 80 identify as female, 13 as
male, 4 as trans, and 7 as gender nonconforming. None identified as intersex or as another
gender identity.
198. Respondents could also choose multiple categories for this question. Of 94
responses to this question, 77 identify as lesbian, 10 as gay, 4 as bisexual, 6 as queer, and 6
as heterosexual. None chose other. The low response rate on bisexual is particularly
striking, given that general population surveys suggest more people identify as bisexual than
lesbian or gay.
199. 55 out of 101 respondents to this question attended at least one event. 19 attended
3–5, 10 attended 6–10, and 2 attended 11 or more.
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or always reading NCLR newsletters, and 89% report often or always
reading NCLR emails.200
Taken together, these donor demographics seem to confirm some
of the concerns of radical critics of the traditional nonprofit impact
litigation model.201 If donors are primarily interested in seeing their
own interests represented, then major impact organizations like NCLR
would only work on behalf of the most well-to-do segments of the
LGBTQ community. While this article confirms that this is a potential
concern, it also challenges the conventional wisdom on this point. The
survey analysis reveals that donor preferences are more complicated
than a narrow vision of their self-interest. Donors support NCLR
partially for their own benefit. They also support NCLR because it does
work to benefit other segments of the LGBTQ community.
B. Charitable Profile of Donors
Many of the respondents have a long history of supporting NCLR.
Almost 75% have donated to NCLR for at least five years, with 38%
donating for over 10 years.202 36% of respondents donated more than
$1500 in the last year, and 21% donated less than $100.203 Most
respondents expected to give the same amount to NCLR this year
(78%), with 14% planning to give more and only 7% planning to give
less.204
As might be expected, most respondents did not only give to
NCLR. Only 11% reported no donations to other LGBT organizations,
and only 4% reported no donations to non-LGBT nonprofits.205 On the
flip side, 30% reported donating over $1500 to other LGBT nonprofits,
and 46% reported donating over $1500 to non-LGBT nonprofits.206
Human Rights Campaign (HRC) was the most common other LGBT
organization that respondents supported.207 Lambda Legal and National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) both also received substantial

200. 31 out of 100 respondents said that they often read NCLR newsletters, and 40 said
that they always read them. For emails, 39 said often and 50 said always. NCLR’s website
and twitter/blog posts were also followed but not as heavily.
201. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text (discussing radical criticisms).
202. 72% of respondents (99 of 137) donated 5+ years. 52 donated 10+ years.
203. 51 of 141 respondents donated over $1500 in 2013. 30 donated less than $100.
204. 109 of 139 respondents plan to give the same in 2014 as in 2013. 20 plan to give
more and 10 plan to give less.
205. 16 of 140 respondents reported no donations to other LGBT organizations. 5 of 135
reported no donations to non-LGBT nonprofits.
206. 42 of 140 respondents reported over $1500 to other LGBT organizations in 2013.
62 of 135 reported over $1500 to non-LGBT nonprofits in 2013.
207. 59 respondents said they give to HRC. This is 42% of the 140 respondents who
answered the question about donations to other LGBT organizations.
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support.208 Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD),
Transgender Law Center, the ACLU LGBT Project, Gay and Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), and the Trevor Project were
all supported by 9–14% of respondents.209 Other common LGBT
organizations supported include Horizons Foundation, Lyon-Martin
Health Services, AIDS Lifecycle, Southern Poverty Law Center, and
Frameline.210 Despite supporting this impressive range of other
organizations, 66% of respondents reported that NCLR is the most
important organization to them.211 These figures suggest that donors
support NCLR for different reasons. Some donors might concentrate
their giving on Bay Area LGBT organizations. Other donors might
focus on political, cultural, health, youth-specific, or lesbian-specific
organizations. NCLR might fit into any one of those donation patterns.
IV. DONOR PREFERENCES AND SUPPORT FOR CAUSE-ORIENTED PILOS
This Part turns to the heart of the article’s analysis: how donors
understand the work of cause-oriented PILOs. The survey reveals
surprising nuance and complexity here. Most importantly, the article
debunks the image of donors as a monolithic entity. Some donors
describe NCLR exclusively as an LGBT organization and celebrate its
commitment to same-sex marriage. Other donors describe it as a
lesbian feminist or social justice organization, never mentioning samesex marriage. Even individual donors embrace potentially contradictory
goals. The same donors can describe NCLR as a radical social justice
organization and a mainstream LGBT organization, despite the
ambiguity created by the tension between these descriptions.
We can make sense of this ambiguity by borrowing some concepts
from organizational theory. Organizational identity refers to a shared
understanding of what an organization does.212 It is a sort of narrative

208. 42 respondents (30%) gave to Lambda Legal and 34 (24%) to NGLTF.
209. Number and percentages of respondents giving to each organization: GLAD (14,
10%), ACLU (19, 14%), TLC (18, 13%), GLAAD (14, 10%), The Trevor Project (12, 9%).
The survey asked about support for all of these organizations by name.
210. The survey did not specifically ask about these organizations, but respondents filled
them in the other box. All of these organizations were named by several respondents.
211. 75 of 114 answers to this question (this number is likely inflated by both selection
and response bias. Selection bias means that donors who consider NCLR very important
were more likely to answer the survey. Response bias means that respondents might be
more likely to answer in a way that will be pleasing to NCLR. Nonetheless, this statistic
still suggests very strong support for NCLR amongst its donors vis-à-vis other LGBT
organizations.
212. See Stephen M. Engel, Organizational Identity as a Constraint on Strategic Action:
A Comparative Analysis of Gay and Lesbian Interest Groups, 21 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV.
66 (2007).
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that defines “who we are” and “what we do.”213 Organizational identity
can almost be thought of as a tangible thing.214 It takes on a life of its
own, independent of the individuals involved. Mission statements are
recorded, staff are hired to fill key goals, relationships are built with
allies, and expertise is built on the organization’s core work. In this
way, identities are very real. Successful organizations tend to retain
their core identity, even when they modify their goals.
Identities fill competing functions. On the one hand, they define
an organization as similar to others of its “type.” This involves
organizational mimicry. If most cause-oriented PILOs have both a
litigation director and an executive director, then new cause-oriented
PILOs are likely to adopt that staff structure. This mimicry happens for
two reasons. First, mimicry might confer legitimacy, especially for new
organizations attempting to establish their credentials. If all other
cause-oriented PILOs have a litigation director and executive director,
then adopting that structure makes a new organization look legitimate.
Second, mimicry reduces the risks involved in developing new
organizational forms. Even if the litigation director / executive director
structure is not the best for every organization, it is a tested model.
Because of this mimicry, we should expect organizations to look
similar to others of their type. On the other hand, organizational
identity can also carve out a niche to distinguish an organization. This
niche defines how they are different from others of their type.
This article argues that NCLR’s identity includes several clusters.
NCLR is a lesbian feminist, LGBT, progressive, and social justice
organization. Its internal staff structure, mission statement,
relationships with allies, and expertise all reflect these different
clusters.215 Just like organizational identity is quasi-independent of the
organization, these clusters are quasi-independent of each other. Most
of the time, they are mutually constitutive. “Social justice” is part of
what it means to be “lesbian feminist.” But they can move in different
directions. “Social justice” might suggest different priorities than
“LGBT” or “lesbian feminist.” Some donors might consider one cluster
more important than the others. Donors might disagree over which
clusters are or should be part of NCLR’s identity.
These concepts provide leverage to support the article’s core
arguments. First, donors can support NCLR for its identity, even when
that identity does not directly benefit the donor. Second, donors can
213. See id.; see also Jane Ward, A New Kind of AIDS: Adapting to the Success of
Protease Inhibitors in an AIDS Care Organization, 23 QUALITATIVE SOC. 247 (2000).
214. See Brayden G. King, Organizational Actors, Character, and Selznick’s Theory of
Organizations, INSTITUTIONS AND IDEALS 149 (Matthew S. Kraatz ed., 2015).
215. See Kosbie, supra note 89.
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have multiple inconsistent understandings of identity. Donors might
agree that NCLR is an “LGBT” organization, but disagree on whether
it is also a “social justice” organization. They might also compare
NCLR to different types of organizations. Both of these findings
support the argument that donors have complex understandings of
public interest law, and that they do not expect direct representation of
their interests for their donations.
A. NCLR’s Identity: History and Staff Descriptions
In November 1977, Berkeley Law graduate Donna Hitchens
founded the Lesbian Rights Project (LRP) at Equal Rights Advocates
(ERA).216 As a project of ERA, the Lesbian Rights Project took on the
former’s feminist philosophy and approach to social change.217 LRP
adopted a strand of lesbian feminism that saw all gender and sexual
inequalities as interconnected.218 When it was founded, LRP took
almost any case “on behalf of a lesbian in which her sexual orientation
is a predominant issue.”219 By the early 1980s, LRP also took cases on
behalf of individual gay men when they advanced the goals of the
organization.220 In 1989, LRP split off from ERA, becoming the
National Center for Lesbian Rights.221 Over time, it expanded its
official mission statement to include work on behalf of gay men,
bisexuals, and transgender people. At each juncture, as it expanded its
official mission, NCLR staff and donors recognized that the
organization was already involved in the new work.222 NCLR also
expanded its geographic footprint beyond its San Francisco base, to the
point that today it truly is involved in litigation and policy advocacy
across the country.
In interviews with NCLR staff in 2013–14, all consistently
described the organization as “lesbian feminist.”223 Staff also described
NCLR as more willing to take chances and more committed to the most
marginalized members of the LGBT community than other LGBT
organizations. The organization dropped the term “lesbian feminism”

216. See id. at 114.
217. See id. at 116.
218. Thus, unlike other lesbian feminist organizations, LRP and NCLR never subscribed
to the philosophy of lesbian separatism. See id. at 116.
219. Letter from Donna Hitchens to Lynn Berry, October 27, 1980 (on file with Cornell
Library Archives, NGLTF Collection). The exception was that LRP would not take incomegenerating cases.
220. See, e.g., Lesbian Rights Project Newsletter 2 (1984) (on file with author)
(discussing a partner benefits case on behalf of two gay men).
221. See Kosbie, supra note 89, at 250.
222. See Kosbie, supra note 89.
223. See id. at 116 n.106.
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from its official literature in 2005, but it continues to be part of their
identity.224 This history is particularly important when we consider that
almost half of survey respondents have given to NCLR for ten or more
years.225 Some of the organization’s most prominent donors today have
supported it since its early days as the Lesbian Rights Project.226 Even
for donors who joined more recently, the organization’s history as a
lesbian feminist organization continues to play a part in defining how it
is perceived today. However, donor preferences are not static. Like the
organizational staff, donor preferences have developed over time.227
Thus, this history provides important background to understand the
complexity of donor preferences today.
B. NCLR’s Identity: Reputation With Donors
In its official mission statement, NCLR defines itself as “[a]
national legal organization committed to advancing the civil and
human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and
their families through litigation, legislation, policy, and public
education.”228 Donors do not always describe it in the same terms.
Donors used a rich variety of terms to answer the question, “[d]escribe
who you think NCLR represents.”229 From their answers, we can
identify several dominant patterns in how donors describe NCLR. The
most common answers focused on NCLR as an LGBT organization.
61% of respondents included this language in their answer.230 This is
not surprising, given NCLR’s official mission statement which defines
its work in almost these terms. The next most common answers
described NCLR as representing lesbians and/or women. 32% of
respondents used this language.231 While these answers are not
surprising, it is worth noting that NCLR has not represented only
women for almost its entire history. It has a long history as a lesbian
feminist organization, but this is not the same as representing only
224. Id.
225. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
226. Because of the anonymity of survey data, I cannot confirm whether any survey
respondents are in this group.
227. For example, Kate Kendell explained that when NCLR added transgender rights to
its official mission, her conversations with donors confirmed their support. Interview Kate
Kendell, Executive Director, NCLR, in San Francisco, Cal. (May 22, 2012).
228. NCLR Mission & History, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS,
http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/mission-history/.
229. This was the first substantive question of the survey, and the 13th question overall.
By positioning this question before other substantive questions, the survey avoided priming
donors to answer it in particular ways. Earlier questions dealt with frequency and history of
donating to NCLR and other organizations.
230. 59 of 96 answers to this question.
231. 31 of 96 respondents.
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lesbians or women. Also fairly common, 25% of respondents described
NCLR as representing queers or the most marginalized in the LGBT
community.232 Finally, a smaller number of respondents described
NCLR as representing some variation of everyone or everyone who is
persecuted.233
While these numbers are interesting, it is even more interesting to
examine their overlap. Because this was an open-ended question, many
answers included more than one of these categories. “Queers” was copresent with “lesbians” in twelve answers, but “LGBT” was only copresent with “queers” in seven answers and with “lesbians” in nine
answers. “LGBT” was co-present with “everyone” in four answers.
“Everyone” was not co-present with “queers” in any answers and in
only one answer with “lesbians.” These numbers are too small to draw
any hard conclusions, but they are suggestive of ways that donors see
these categories as aligning. “Queers” and “lesbians” are seen as more
radical than the mainstream “LGBT” rights. Nonetheless, if asked
directly, most donors would probably agree that NCLR represents all
of these groups. These answers capture a high degree of nuance and
understanding in how donors think about LGBT litigation. Donors do
draw meaningful distinctions between different subgroups. To many
donors, it is important that NCLR specifically represents “lesbians” or
“queers,” and not just “LGBT people.”
Even more nuance emerges at the level of individual responses. In
the category “LGBT,” the acronyms LGBT or GLBT were the most
common.234 Some answers used “LGBTQ,” adding “queers” to expand
a little on the group.235 Similarly, other answers started with LGBT but
then added that NCLR focuses on groups like lesbians, trans people, or
trans youth. Going in the other direction of generality, other answers
added in families or allies to the LGBT group. Finally, some answers
dispensed with the LGBT label all together and instead wrote general
descriptions like “advancing our rights through litigation.”236 The other
categories included a similar diverse range of answers. Several answers
that focused on lesbians also acknowledged that NCLR’s work was
broader than just lesbian issues. As one answer explained, “[l]esbians,
although not exclusively. . .” Other answers in this category
emphasized issues of social justice, such as “[w]omen identified people

232. 24 of 96 respondents.
233. 13 of 96 (13%) of respondents.
234. Most responses used these acronyms but some spelled out the groups.
235. Answers that included only the “LGBTQ” acronym with nothing more counted
under the “LGBT” category. I only counted them under “queer” if they included a more
explicit reference.
236. I treated these as an implicit reference to the “LGBT” category.
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suffering from injustice.” “Queers” was the broadest category. While
several answers explicitly used the label “queer,” others described
“non-heterosexual[s],” “nontraditional sexualities,” or noted a
“particularly strong understanding of race, gender, and class.”
Across all these categories, answers reveal striking heterogeneity
in how donors describe who NCLR represents. On the one hand, there
are several dominant patterns that donors agree on. On the other hand,
within those categories donors have a range of more or less nuanced
understandings of what it means to represent LGBT people, lesbians, or
queers. More importantly, how donors describe who NCLR represents
does not always line up with their own self-identity. Many donors
describe NCLR as representing lesbians, LGBT people, or everyone.
These donors almost surely count themselves in those categories. Other
donors add that NCLR focuses on the most marginalized, or
specifically named groups like trans youth. To these donors, it is
important that NCLR represents a group that is broader than the
individual donors. In at least some cases, donors appear to describe
NCLR as primarily or exclusively representing a group that they do not
personally belong to. This is easiest to see with the six respondents
who self-identified as straight or heterosexual. Of these six, only one
described a group that they might belong to: “people who care about
justice for sexual minorities.” Even here, this respondent positions
themselves as an ally to the core community. The other five straightidentified respondents described NCLR as representing the LGBT
community. Of the ten respondents who self-identified as queer, only
half described NCLR as representing queers. Self-identified queers
might easily see themselves as also belonging in the categories of
“lesbian,” “gay,” or “LGBT.” Nonetheless, this suggests at least a
potential discrepancy. This also means that many of the 25% who
described NCLR as representing queers might not self-identify that
way. These disjunctures between individual identity and who NCLR
represents support the article’s argument that donors do not expect
NCLR to work in their narrow self-interest.
Another way to measure who NCLR represents is to examine the
data on what other organizations donors support. As discussed above,
almost all NCLR donors also give to other LGBT and non-LGBT
organizations.237 In fact, donors give to an impressive range of other
organizations.238 What is most striking about these data is the lack of
any clear clustering of donations to other organizations. If donors
support organizations that they consider similar to one another, then we
237. See supra Part II.B.
238. See id.
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might expect to see clusters defined by shared characteristics. The lack
of sharply defined clusters reinforces this article’s argument that
donors have many, often subtle reasons for supporting an organization.
Focusing on the three organizations supported by the most NCLR
donors confirms this lack of defined clusters. For the most part,
knowing that a survey respondent donated to one of these organizations
offered little predictive value in what other organizations they also
donated to. Human Rights Campaign (HRC), Lambda Legal, and
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF)239 were supported by
more NCLR donors than any other organizations. Donors to HRC gave
to Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD),240 the ACLU,
and Lambda Legal at about the same rates as all respondents.241
However, donors to HRC appear to be slightly more likely than other
survey respondents to give to NGLTF.242 HRC and NGLTF are
considered the two major national LGBT political organizations
today.243 Nonetheless, they are often described as occupying distinct
niches in the national political sphere.244 NGLTF is often described as
more politically progressive and focuses on building movement
infrastructure at the grassroots level.245 HRC focuses its attention at the
national political level, using more moderate political strategies to gain
access to traditional levers of government power.246 Perhaps most
surprising then is that donors to both HRC and NGLTF supported local
organizations at the same rates as all respondents.247 Not surprisingly,
donors to Lambda Legal were also more likely to support the other
major LGBT legal organizations.248 In fact, it is notable that this trend
239. More recently called the National LGBTQ Task Force.
240. More recently called the GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders.
241. Comparing only respondents who made any donations to other LGBT groups. 15%
(HRC donors) compared to 7% (HRC non-donors) gave to GLAD; 20% (HRC donors)
compared to 10% (HRC non-donors) gave to the ACLU; and 40% (HRC donors) compared
to 25% (HRC non-donors) gave to Lambda. However, only the Lambda-HRC comparison is
statistically significant at p<.05 using Chi-Square test.
242. 39% (HRC donors) compared to 15% (HRC non-donors) gave to NGLTF.
Statistically significant at p < .01 using Chi-Square test.
243. See Engel, supra note 212 (comparing NGLTF and HRC).
244. See id. (describing NGLTF and HRC as occupying distinct but complementary
niches in the national political scene).
245. See John D’Emilio, Organizational Tales: Interpreting the NGLTF Story, in
CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 469 (John D’Emilio
et al. eds., 2000) (describing NGLTF history).
246. See Engel, supra note 212.
247. 57% of all respondents supported a local organization. 58% of HRC donors and
56% of NGLTF donors supported a local organization.
248. Comparing only respondents who made any donations to other LGBT groups. 24%
(Lambda donors) compared to 4% (Lambda non-donors) gave to GLAD; 26% (Lambda
donors) compared to 9% (Lambda non-donors) gave to the ACLU. Both are significant at
p<.01 using Chi-Square test.
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is relatively unsubstantial.
Moving beyond the big organizations, donors named a wide range
of other organizations that they support. Many of these were local, San
Francisco Bay Area organizations. Others were specialized, dealing
with lesbian health issues, LGBT film, HIV/AIDS healthcare, or
various other issues. As with the big national organizations, no clear
patterns emerged in which additional organizations donors supported.
The range and variety of other organizations that NCLR donors support
further confirms that donors draw nuanced and meaningful distinctions
between many similar organizations.
Further complicating this, some donors likely support
organizations precisely because they consider them similar. Lambda
Legal and NCLR might both be meaningfully described as national
LGBT legal organizations in this respect.249 But other donors likely
support the same organizations because they consider them different.
While Lambda and NCLR are both national LGBT legal organizations,
some donors might support both because Lambda has a larger presence
across the country, and NCLR has a longer history of supporting
lesbian rights.
Another way to look at these data is to compare how donors
describe who NCLR represents and what other organizations they
support. If donors who described NCLR as representing “LGBT
people” donated to a different subset of other organizations than donors
who described it as representing “lesbians” or “everyone,” that would
provide alternate evidence of clustering. As with the above analysis,
there are no clear patterns in donations breaking down answers this
way. At most, respondents who described NCLR as representing
“everyone” were slightly less likely to donate to other national LGBT
organizations. There were no notable differences in donation patterns
between respondents who described NCLR as representing “lesbians,”
“queers,” or “LGBT people.” If donors expected cause-oriented PILOs
to work only in their own self-interest, we would expect to see more
clustering by how donors describe NCLR. This lack of clustering
further reinforces the argument that donors’ preferences are not directly
reducible to self-interest.
C. NCLR’s Goals
Answers to what are NCLR’s goals were even more diverse.250

249. Confirming this point, one respondent described NCLR as an important companion
to Lambda Legal in the fight for LGBT legal equality.
250. This question immediately followed “Describe who you think NCLR represents” in
the survey.
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Like the previous question, answers can be meaningfully grouped into
several categories. By far the most common answer described NCLR’s
goals in terms of LGBT “equality” or ending “discrimination.”251 Most
of these answers explicitly used the words equality and/or
discrimination. Some also used the phrase “LGBT rights.” In fact,
seven respondents who described NCLR as representing lesbians
specifically also described its goals in terms of LGBT equality. The
focus on equality is not surprising, given the dominant legal language
of equal protection and nondiscrimination. It does, however, lend
support to critics of cause-oriented PILOs who argue that they can only
hope to achieve legal equality rather than meaningful social justice. If
donors think in terms of equality and nondiscrimination rather than
social justice, then the work of cause-oriented PILOs might be so
limited. However, answers to this question also show that donors
understand the language of equality in more complex ways than
suggested by the critics. For example, answers to this question included
“equality under the law, a more fair and just society, liberation;” “full
equality for all, working first from the base of those most at risk;” and
“achieve lived equality for LGBT people.” Others mentioned equality
in specific areas, including immigration, housing, and employment.
These answers also include elements of social justice and LGBT
dignity, discussed more below. The overlap is important. It shows that
“equality” is a rich concept for donors. It is not limited to a formal
legal definition. Instead, it includes a broader range of ideas about
social dignity and citizenship.252
A smaller percent of respondents described NCLR’s goals in
terms of social justice253 or human rights.254 Answers that invoked
human rights often did not even name LGBT people. Several answers
included a variant of “human and civil rights for all.” Similarly, “social
justice” answers did not always name LGBT people explicitly. They
wrote in the language of broad social inequalities. Several named
specific issues, such as jobs, housing, or healthcare. Notably, both of
these categories broaden NCLR’s goals beyond the LGBT community.
It is not clear how meaningful the distinction between “human rights”
and “social justice” is to donors. The language of social justice is often
251. 69 of 89 (78%) answers to this question. This also includes answers that used
vague language about supporting LGBT people.
252. In a fascinating study, George Lovell finds that people wrote into the Justice
Department in the 1930s using the language of equality and civil rights to describe every
manner of social injury. Lovell’s findings confirm that “equality” has a far richer meaning
to the general public than its narrow legal definition. See GEORGE I. LOVELL, THIS IS NOT
CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS TALK IN 1939 AMERICA pincite (2012).
253. 20 of 89 (22%) respondents.
254. 14 of 89 (16%) respondents.
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used to describe a proactive agenda of eliminating social inequalities
and providing meaningful social inclusion. It might connect LGBT
issues to inequalities around race, gender, class, or immigration status.
Human rights may or may not include these broader commitments.
Finally, a small number of respondents used the language of “dignity,”
“respect,” or “inclusion” to describe NCLR’s goals.255 While small, this
group is important to note because this language explicitly goes beyond
the promises of equality under the law. Dignity and respect invoked
ideas of social belonging, rather than mere legal equality.
In addition to these four categories, 27% of respondents explicitly
mentioned the law or the judicial system in their answer.256 In at least
some cases, this descriptor appears to limit how respondents defined
NCLR’s goals. For example, one respondent wrote “to change laws on
state and national levels.” Other answers explicitly mention legal
change as contributing to broader goals of social or political change. In
many cases—both in answers that mention the law and those that do
not—it is not clear how far respondents think of NCLR’s work as
extending beyond litigation. Here again we see that some donors think
of NCLR’s goals in fairly narrow terms of winning formal legal
equality via major impact litigation. But many other donors think of
NCLR’s goals in broader terms that often extend beyond the interests
of individual donors.
The survey also included other questions on NCLR’s goals.
Answers to these questions add even more depth to the picture of how
donors think about the nuances of cause-oriented PILOs. One question
asked donors to list the three most important things that NCLR has
done in the past year.257 Not surprisingly, all of their answers could be
grouped under the broad heading of “LGBT rights.” Along with LGBT
rights, almost a quarter explicitly mentioned community outreach and
education, and 16% mentioned social justice.258 A small number also
included lesbian rights or visibility.259 As explained above, 32% of
respondents describe NCLR as representing lesbians or women, and a
large number donate to other lesbian-oriented organizations. In
response to this question, we see even more nuance. While almost a
third of donors define lesbians as part of the core constituency that
255. 7 of 89 (8%) respondents.
256. 24 of 89 respondents.
257. This question included three separate answer fields. As with all questions,
respondents could skip filling in one, two, or all three fields.
258. 20 out of 82 mentioned community outreach. 13 out of 82 mentioned social justice.
259. 5 out of 82 (6%). Many of the general “LGBT rights” issues mentioned, such as
partner benefits, marriage, or employment discrimination, would benefit lesbians. This
category only includes answers that explicitly mentioned lesbian rights or visibility as
distinct from broader LGBT issues.
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NCLR represents, only a small number name lesbian visibility or
empowerment as an important accomplishment in its own right. At a
more general level, these discrepancies support the article’s argument
that donors to cause-oriented PILOs often have a deep and nuanced
understanding of what the law can do. Donors bring multiple
overlapping but also conflicting visions of legal and social change.
Turning to specific issues, almost all respondents listed same-sex
marriage in NCLR’s important accomplishments.260 Some listed
marriage for all three accomplishments. Others listed marriage as part
of a broader item, like relationship recognition or family. Still others
listed a more specific marriage-related accomplishment, like winning
the Utah case.261 After marriage, school and youth related issues were
the next most common item, included by over a quarter of
respondents.262 Several donors explicitly mentioned NCLR’s “Born
Perfect” campaign in this respect. Others listed its work fighting
conversion therapy or on behalf of trans youth. Donors also listed a
wide variety of other specific accomplishments, revealing an
impressive knowledge of NCLR’s work. About 10% each listed
transgender rights, immigration and asylum, and rural LGBT issues.263
Smaller numbers listed racial justice, sports, elder law, and several
other issues and individual cases.
The dominance of marriage in these lists is important to consider.
This survey went out to donors in fall of 2014, at the same time that
Obergefell and related cases were working their way through the
Courts of Appeals on their way to the Supreme Court.264 The media
already disproportionately focused on same-sex marriage to the
exclusion of other LGBT issues,265 and with a Supreme Court case
seemingly inevitable, this tendency was more pronounced than usual.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that marriage would be forefront in donors
minds when they answered this survey.266 Timing issues aside,
marriage equality clearly resonates with a large percent of NCLR’s
major donors. Critics of the traditional nonprofit PILO model might
seize on this as proof that nonprofits only benefit the already well to-

260. 72 out of 82 respondents (88%).
261. This answer refers to NCLR’s involvement in Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193
(10th Cir. 2014).
262. 27 out of 82 respondents (33%).
263. Transgender rights: 9 out of 82, 11%. Immigration and asylum: 8 out of 82, 10%.
Rural project: 7 out of 82, 9%.
264. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
265. See Interview with Jon Davidson, Legal Director, Lambda Legal, in Los Angeles,
Cal. (Aug. 24, 2013).
266. One donor explicitly acknowledged that their answer was likely influenced by the
media attention to marriage.
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do. In this formulation, marriage does little to address systemic
inequalities around race and class. It does not address issues of
healthcare, employment, or education.
This glib dismissal of marriage equality as the province of the rich
obscures more nuanced understandings of marriage and its relation to
the rest of NCLR’s work. Most importantly, no respondents seem to
think that securing marriage equality means NCLR should close up
shop. They celebrate marriage equality as an important step, but see it
as part of NCLR’s broader ongoing work. Several donors mentioned
that the visibility of the marriage issue could generate positive social
change. Others included practical benefits for LGBT families,
including burial rights for spouses. Donors positioned marriage
alongside the gamut of NCLR’s work, including employment
discrimination, partner benefits, racial justice, youth issues, and
transgender rights.
Answers to the next question, other issues that NCLR should work
on, provides further evidence of this complexity in donor views. A
large majority of donors did not identify other issues that NCLR should
work on.267 Many went a step further, writing explicitly that there were
no additional issues and “commend[ing] [NCLR] for the broad range of
issues it already undertakes.”268 Donors who did identify other issues
typically focused on NCLR’s core mission.269 Several wrote about
lesbian-specific issues. One answer focused on “aging lesbians” and
another wrote “more priority on issues that affect lesbians as lesbians/
women, not the whole LGBT movement.” Responses in this category
also identified more work on transgender rights as important. A smaller
number of respondents identified specific legal and political issues.
These issues included nonpartisan political redistricting, religious
freedom for LGBT families, and a focus on judicial nominees.270 In all
of these cases, respondents noted how these issues tied into NCLR’s
work on LGBT rights. Finally, some respondents identified broader
issues of social justice, including racial justice, mass incarceration, and
jobs and housing.271 These questions reveal that while high-profile
issues like same-sex marriage are important to most donors, many
donors also identify issues dealing with trans youth or racial justice.
Turning to the next set of questions, the survey found that most donors

267. Only 42 respondents answered this question, in comparison with 82 answering the
previous question. It is impossible to distinguish respondents who entirely skipped the
question from those who read it but did not identify anything that NCLR should work on.
268. 17 out of 42 respondents who answered this question (40%).
269. 14 out of 42 respondents (33%).
270. 7 out of 42 respondents (17%).
271. 4 out of 42 respondents (10%).
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support these broader issues when asked directly about them.
D. Allocation of Resources
In addition to the broad open-ended questions discussed above,
the survey asked several closed-ended questions to gauge donor
support for a range of specific issues. A large bank of questions asked
donors to rank how important specific issues were to them individually,
how important they were to NCLR, and how important they were to
other LGBT organizations.272 The largest discrepancies between
respondents’ individual preferences and their perceptions of NCLR’s
preferences were in the areas of sports, immigration, adoption and
family, and transgender rights. Respondents ranked all four of these
issues as somewhat less important to them personally than they were to
NCLR.273 On all but transgender rights, respondents also ranked these
issues as substantially less important to other LGBT organizations than
to NCLR.274 These results are important because NCLR has longstanding programs in all four of these areas. NCLR actively promotes
its work in these areas as one way to distinguish itself from similar
organizations. These responses confirm that donors are aware of these
fine-grained distinctions between organizations. They also suggest that
donors do not only support organizations where their personal
preferences line up perfectly with organizational priorities.
Answers to two other issues are worth noting for the comparisons
between NCLR and other organizations. Respondents perceived almost
no difference between NCLR’s priorities and those of other LGBT
organizations on HIV/AIDS.275 NCLR has never defined HIV/AIDS as
a priority. Since the 1980s, it has argued cases on behalf of people with
HIV, but when they support NCLR’s other goals.276 Other LGBT
272. Earlier in the survey, donors were asked to identify which other LGBT organization
they consider most important. If they answered that question, the survey asked them to
compare NCLR to that organization. If they did not answer that question, the survey asked
them to compare NCLR to “other LGBT organizations.”
273. Respondents were asked to rank issues on a five-point scale, with answers of
“Lowest Priority,” “Low Priority,” “Average Priority,” “High Priority,” and “Highest
Priority.” The survey converted these answers into scores from 1 to 5. Differences between
average donor preferences and perceptions of NCLR preferences were sports (-.55),
transgender rights (-.55), adoption and family (-.67), and immigration (-.38). All of these
differences were significant at p<.001 using a paired-samples t test. Sports was also the
only issue that respondents ranked as below “Average Priority” overall. Sports received an
average score of 2.63, somewhere between “Low Priority” and “Average Priority.”
274. Respondents ranked transgender rights as more important to NCLR than other
organizations but with less difference. All differences significant at p<.001 using a pairedsamples t test.
275. Mean difference of .03, not statistically significant.
276. For example, in the 1980s NCLR argued a child custody case on behalf of a father
with HIV. See Lesbian Rights Project Newsletter 1 (Fall 1987) (on file with author)
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organizations, on the other hand, continue to make HIV/AIDS a
priority. This lack of perceived difference might reflect the lower
visibility that HIV/AIDS work receives today. Respondents also
perceived same-sex marriage as substantially more important to NCLR
than to other organizations.277 NCLR has invested heavily in same-sex
marriage work, so in some sense this is not surprising. But many other
LGBT organizations have similarly invested heavily in this issue. This
set of questions also provides further evidence that donors do not
expect cause-oriented PILOs to act just in the donors’ self-interest.
Several of the issues that donors ranked as high priority potentially
benefit most donors directly, including marriage equality,278
relationship recognition,279 ending government discrimination,280 and
addressing state and federal policy questions.281 Employment
discrimination282 and healthcare283 are also highly ranked but may be
less directly important to many donors, given their high socioeconomic
status.284 Finally, some highly ranked issues only directly benefit a
small set of donors: racial justice,285 elder law,286 youth protection,287
and transgender rights.288 These questions show that when asked about
individual issues, donors do support several issues that do not directly
affect them.
However, there are limits to this support. A later question asked
donors to rank how they would allocate resources between eight
specific issues.289 This forced ranking prevented donors from saying
everything is important. Consistent with earlier findings, “marriage
equality” was ranked as most important by far more donors than any
other issue.290 “Employment discrimination,” “family and
(discussing case on behalf of “Artie”).
277. Respondents describe NCLR as supporting same-sex marriage more than other
organizations by a score of .59, significant at p<.001 using a paired-samples t test.
278. 4.0 on 5.0 scale.
279. 4.1 on 5.0 scale.
280. 4.1 on 5.0 scale.
281. 4.2 on 5.0 scale for federal policy and 4.1 for state policy.
282. 4.2 on 5.0 scale.
283. 3.9 on 5.0 scale.
284. See supra, Part II.A (discussing donor demographics).
285. 4.0 on 5.0 scale.
286. 3.8 on 5.0 scale.
287. 3.8 on 5.0 scale.
288. 3.5 on 5.0 scale.
289. There was a statistically significant difference in allocation of resources, p<.001
(Friedman Test).
290. 43 out of 98 responses to this question. On average, marriage equality was ranked
3.1 out of 8 issues. Interestingly, it was also ranked as least important by more respondents
than “family and relationships,” “employment discrimination,” “youth and teens,” “seniors,”
and “government discrimination.”
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relationships,” and “government discrimination” were also ranked as
most important by a large number of respondents.291 On the flip side,
no respondents ranked “HIV/AIDS” as most important and only three
ranked it in the top three issues. Over half ranked it as least
important.292 “Transgender rights” and “seniors” were also ranked as
most important by few respondents and were, on average, ranked well
within the bottom half of issues.293 A final set of questions asked
donors if any of these eight issues were “not LGBT issues.” Even
though HIV/AIDS and trans rights were ranked as less important in the
previous question, there was virtual unanimity that they are LGBT
issues.294 A substantial minority of respondents did say that “racial
justice” and “sports” are not LGBT issues, and smaller numbers also
said that “immigration,” “criminal justice,” and “elder law” are not
LGBT issues.295 These closed-ended questions add further complexity
and nuance to the open-ended questions. A large majority of donors do
support NCLR’s work on issues like trans rights, youth protections, and
racial justice. Many of them consider these issues as important parts of
what NCLR does, but they also consider them less central than higherprofile issues like marriage equality.
The final substantive question in the survey asked donors to rank
several factors as reasons for donating to NCLR.296 As with previous
questions, answers reveal some donor self-interest and some broader
motivations.297 Only a very small minority of donors explicitly make
their self-interest a primary reason for donating. Though most donors
expect that their self-interest will be at least partially served via the
organization’s work, they expect the organization to focus first on its
291. All of these were ranked as most important by 16 respondents. On average,
“employment discrimination” was ranked 3.2, “family and relationships” was ranked 3.7,
and “government discrimination” was ranked 3.7. Only the difference between “marriage
equality” and “family and relationships” was statistically significant at p<.05 using a
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. This means that “marriage equality,” “employment
discrimination,” and “government discrimination” were statistically indistinguishable for
importance.
292. 52 out of 98 responses (53%).
293. Only one respondent ranked “seniors” as most important, and five ranked
“transgender rights” as most important. On average, “seniors” was ranked 5.3, and
“transgender rights” was ranked 5.2. This difference was not statistically significant.
294. No respondents said transgender rights are not an LGBT issue, and only two said
HIV/AIDS is not.
295. Numbers saying not an LGBT issue: racial justice (18), sports (15), immigration
(9), criminal justice (9), and elder law (8).
296. Several demographic questions followed this question but no additional substantive
questions.
297. The last substantive question asked respondents to rank several criteria as
motivations for donating. This question was placed immediately before demographic
questions but after all other substantive questions. This survey design was intended to
trigger respondent reflection on issues raised in earlier questions.
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goals, rather than on donors’ own self-interest. These findings reinforce
the article’s argument that pressure from donors is only a moderate
constraint on the ability of cause-oriented PILOs to experiment with
service delivery.
Respondents ranked most of the factors fairly evenly, but three
factors stood out as more or less important. “Willingness to pursue
broad, transformative goals” was ranked as most important by more
respondents than any other factor.298 Along with “work in coalition
with other LGBT political and legal organizations,” it was the most
important factor to respondents.299 At the other end, “[r]esponsiveness
to preferences and wishes of donors” was ranked as the least important
factor by 45% of respondents.300 Only five respondents ranked it in the
top four most important factors. Even if this result does not capture the
extent that respondents see their own preferences captured in other
factors, such as “broad, transformative goals,” it seems counterintuitive
that they only expect NCLR to be indirectly accountable to their
preferences. Most respondents have been giving to NCLR for many
years, and yet they rank responsiveness to their own preferences as the
least important factor in their giving.301 This makes sense in the context
of how these donors describe NCLR’s work. As this article previously
discussed, donors see NCLR as a leader in the lesbian, LGBT, and
social justice communities. They support NCLR because of that
leadership. Their responses to this question suggest that they expect
NCLR to be a leader on these issues, even when that means going
against the wishes of individual donors. As one respondent explained
in declining to identify anything else that NCLR should work on, “I’m
sure they know the best priorities to work on with the resources they
have.”302
This question included several pairs of factors that were in direct
tension: “Willingness to pursue broad, transformative goals” vs.
“Willingness to pursue the small, incremental steps that add up to
positive social change”; “Emphasis on representing the most
marginalized members of the LGBT community” vs. “Emphasis on
representing the goals of the majority of LGBT people”; and “Focus
only on LGBT issues” vs. “Work in coalitions on broader issues of
298. Of 99 responses to this question, 24 ranked this most important. Only 18
respondents ranked this amongst the 3 least important factors.
299. “Transformative goals” got an average ranking of 3.8 out of 9, and “Work in
coalitions” got an average ranking of 3.9. This difference was not statistically significant.
300. 45 of 99 respondents ranked this least important. 80 ranked it in the three least
important factors.
301. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
302. Answer in response to question: “Are there other important issues that you wish
NCLR did work on?”
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social justice.” As already discussed, “transformative goals” was the
most common primary factor. However, “incremental steps” was
ranked almost as important.303 Both of these were in the top three
factors across respondents, suggesting many donors do not see these
factors as in tension with each other. More interestingly, “focus only on
LGBT issues” and “work in coalitions” also had similar average
rankings.304 However, “focus only on LGBT issues” had a bimodal
distribution of answers, with many respondents ranking it as most or
least important.305 In contrast, there was no clear pattern in how
respondents ranked “work in coalitions.” Finally, “representing the
most marginalized” and “representing the majority” both had no clear
pattern to their rankings.
V. LESSONS FOR CAUSE-ORIENTED PILOS
Donors constitute a key group of stakeholders for cause-oriented
PILOs. Understanding their views on public interest law has been the
central project of this article. The findings presented confirm the
importance of taking donor preferences seriously. Donors’ interests do
not always align with those of the organizations that they support.
Critically, however, donors often tolerate and even support work that
they are not personally invested in, when that work aligns with the core
mission of the organization.306 More importantly, donors are not a
monolithic group. Donors generally agree on and support an
organization’s major goals, but they describe the organization and rank
its priorities differently.307
Understanding the complexity of donor preferences is particularly
important considering the tremendous growth in the PIL industry over
the past thirty years. Individual organizations are much larger, and
there are far more organizations involved.308 This means that
organizations are in more direct competition with each other for
fundraising dollars.309 This competition can offer organizations more
opportunity and incentive to experiment with new goals, services, and
strategies. In NCLR’s case, its donors are deeply loyal. Their support is
303. On average, “incremental steps” was ranked 4.3 in comparison to the 3.8 for
“transformative goals.” This difference was not statistically significant.
304. There was no statistically significant difference between these factors.
305. 17% of respondents ranked this as the most important of nine factors, and 43%
ranked it in the bottom two.
306. In the case of NCLR, for example, many donors were not personally interested in
the organization’s work on sports. See supra notes 273, 295.
307. In the case of NCLR, almost all donors agreed on marriage equality as an important
objective. But at least one donor described NCLR as not focusing on marriage.
308. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 59.
309. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2076.
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based on NCLR’s long history of strong leadership as a lesbian
feminist organization. This gives NCLR some flexibility to innovate, as
donors are not directly measuring every new program. In particular,
two findings stand out. First, donors respond positively to new goals
and areas of work that expand upon an organization’s core mission. In
NCLR’s case, donors embraced its newly created programs on rural
issues and school bullying. They also described NCLR as an LGBT
organization that focuses particular attention on lesbians and the most
marginalized, reflecting NCLR’s history of expanding its mission.
Second, donors differentiate between similar organizations in important
ways. Donors to NCLR described it as an LGBT organization, but they
also identified several key issues where it was different from other
LGBT organizations.
Donor preferences are also key to questions about how to improve
the accountability of social justice-oriented legal organizations. The
core of accountability is the concern that an organization should be
responsive to the community that it represents. To critics, donor
relationships threaten accountability because donors represent an
alternate set of interests.310 Here this article makes one of its biggest
interventions. Typically, we think of donor outreach as a form of
marketing. Keep the donors happy so that they continue to support the
organization. A more beneficial way to think of this outreach is as an
opportunity for community engagement. Donor outreach is not only
about marketing, but also about education. Ideally, it is a two-way
communication channel, with the nonprofit attuned to donor feedback.
As we have seen, donor preferences reflect some degree of selfinterest. While many donors are likely insulated from the concerns of
the more marginalized members of the community, they are deeply
engaged members of the community that a PILO represents. They are
deeply invested in issues beyond their own self-interest. Many of them
have extensive knowledge of the social, political, and legal issues
facing the community and represent an important voice that PILOs
should be in conversation with.
The major concern with the donor-funded nonprofit model is that
donors’ preferences come to replace community needs in determining
goals. The findings presented in this article confirm that there is some
basis for this concern. But the findings also refute the strength of this
criticism. Cause-oriented PILOs rely heavily on individual donors for
their primary funding, along with foundation grants.311 These donors—
in the case of NCLR and likely in the case of most similar
310. See Spade, supra note 151.
311. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2054.
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organizations—come largely from a more privileged sector of the
community.312 The survey findings confirm that donors recall work on
big sexy issues, like same-sex marriage, more than issues like racial
justice, poverty, and housing. At the same time, donors value NCLR’s
aggressive social justice agenda and its key work on less glamorous
issues. For many donors, it is critical that NCLR’s agenda is far
broader than donors’ own self-interests. Donors note the importance of
NCLR issues like its rural project and its trans youth project. They
almost uniformly reject responsiveness to donors as an important
consideration in deciding where they donate.313 This complexity does
not reduce neatly to any statement about whether donors act only in
their self-interest. Instead, the politics of donor interests are messy and
complicated.
Taken together, these findings suggest that donors reward
nonprofits that have a strong and consistent mission. They expect
PILOs to focus on their mission more than their donors. There is some
pressure towards homogeneity. Donors respond to high-profile
litigation, like the same-sex marriage cases. Thus, it is no surprise that
most major cause-oriented PILOs operate with the same basic
structure.314 However, focusing on these similarities obscures a lot of
diversity. Donors also respond to engagement with local communities
and work on particular issues that are not being addressed by others.
They are receptive to experiments with delivering new and innovative
services to underserved populations. Since we are unlikely to see a
change in the necessity for donor-supported nonprofits, organizations
are best served by building donor relations that not only promote
fundraising but also improve the organization.
CONCLUSION
This article is rooted in the broader challenge of improving access
to justice for ordinary Americans. While there are no simple answers to
this problem, there are some promising trends. State and local
governments continue to experiment with new programs to fund legal
aid. By designating funding for particular issues or populations, such as
affordable housing or the elderly, these programs can gain political
support. Legal aid offices use these programs, along with a growing
number of foundation grants, to experiment with new ways to conduct
outreach and deliver services to relevant communities. The private bar
312. See supra Part II.A (detailing donor demographic profile).
313. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
314. Hilbink argues that as the public interest law industry developed in the 1970s, a
standard set of expectations emerged that included elite lawyers, impact litigation, and
donor-supported nonprofit work. See Hilbink, supra note 72.
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also increasingly embraces pro bono as a professional responsibility.
New York state has gone as far as implementing a pro bono
requirement for new attorneys seeking admission to the state bar.
Young lawyers identify pro bono programs as a major consideration in
their job search, and many of them remain committed to pro bono once
they are in private practice. Private-public plaintiff-side firms also
benefit from this increased interest in pro bono service. Many of them
compete for the same elite candidates as the largest law firms.
Despite these positive trends, legal aid, private firm pro bono, and
cause-oriented PILOs all operate in their own silos, largely independent
of one another.315 Better coordination will allow these organizations to
capitalize on their individual strengths. For example, federal
restrictions prevent legal aid offices from directly engaging in
administrative advocacy. But the lawyers there develop valuable
expertise in how administrative policies affect the lives of the poor.
Better coordination will allow them to share that expertise. For causeoriented PILOs, the lesson of this article is that donors have deep
knowledge of the challenges facing their communities. Donors are not
only aware of high-profile impact litigation. They are also invested in
programs that promote education, coalition building, and grassroots
outreach. By promoting more regular engagement with their donors,
cause-oriented PILOs can increase their accountability to the
communities that they serve and strengthen their role in promoting
access to justice.
APPENDIX: SURVEY TEXT
Donation History
1. Approximately how much did you donate to NCLR in 2013?
[Six options provided]
2. Approximately how much did you donate to NCLR in 2011,
2012, and 2013 combined? [Six options provided]
3. Do you expect to donate the same, more, or less to NCLR in
2014 as in 2013? [Three options provided]
4. How many years have you donated to NCLR? [Four options
provided]
5. Besides NCLR, how much did you donate to other LGBT
organizations in 2013? [Seven options provided]
6. What other specific organizations did you donate to? [Nine
specific organizations, “a local community center or organization,” and
“other” provided]
7. What other organization(s) did you donate to? [Open-ended
315. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 59, at 1619 (describing “two PIL industries”).
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question]
8. Which one of the LGBT organizations that you donate to is
most important to you? [Answer choices provided based on previous
responses]
9. Besides NCLR, which organization is most important to you?
[Question only asked if NCLR chosen for previous question]
10. How much did you donate to non-LGBT nonprofit
organizations in 2013?
Donor Preferences and Perceptions of NCLR
11. Describe who you think NCLR represents [Open-ended
question]
12. Describe what you think NCLR’s goals are [Open-ended
question]
Survey directions: “LGBT organizations are constantly
reassessing how they allocate resources between different issues.
Allocating resources in one area means less in another area. For each
issue listed below, please answer how high a priority it is to you, how
high a priority you think it is to NCLR, and how high a priority you
think it is to the other organization listed. These questions ask you to
compare NCLR to another organization based on your previous
answers.” [For each issue in questions 13-28, respondents could choose
“Lowest priority”, “Low priority”, “Average priority”, “High priority”,
and “Highest priority” for themselves, NCLR, and whatever other
organization they identified as most important to them.]
13. Marriage Equality
14. Relationship recognition (partner benefits and other legal
protections in addition to marriage)
15. Adoption, custody, and other family issues
16. Racial justice
17. Employment discrimination
18. Healthcare and disability
19. Immigration
20. Elder law
21. Youth protection
22. Transgender rights
23. HIV/AIDS discrimination
24. Criminal justice and prisons
25. Sports
26. Government discrimination
27. Federal policy and legislation
28. State and local policy and legislation
29. Of the previous issues, are there any that you would describe
as “not an LGBT issue”? (choose all that apply) [Selection boxes with
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issues from questions 13-28]
30. List the three most important things to you that NCLR has
done in the past year [Open-ended question with three answer boxes]
31. Are there other important issues that you wish NCLR did work
on? [Open-ended question]
32. Please drag and drop to rank how you would allocate
resources between the following. [“Government discrimination”,
“Seniors”, “HIV/AIDS”, “Marriage equality”, “Transgender rights”,
“Family and relationships”, “Youth and teens”, “Employment
discrimination”]
33. Drag and drop to rank each of the following in how important
of a factor it is in your decision to donate to specific LGBT
organizations (NCLR and any other organizations that you donate to).
[“Responsiveness to preferences and wishes of donors”, “Willingness
to pursue the small, incremental steps that add up to positive social
change”, “Emphasis on representing the most marginalized members of
the LGBT community”, “Focus only on LGBT issues”, “Willingness to
pursue broad, transformative goals”, “Constant innovation and
experimentation with new ways to represent LGBT people”,” Work in
coalitions on broader issues of social justice”, “Work in coalitions with
other LGBT political and legal organizations”, “Emphasis on
representing the goals of the majority of LGBT people”]
Demographic Questions
34. How do you follow NCLR’s news? [Rank how often you read
each item as “Never”, “Sometimes”, “Often”, or “Always” for “NCLR
newsletters”, “NCLR website”, “NCLR postings on facebook, twitter,
or their blog”, and “NCLR emails”]
35. How many NCLR events have you attended in the past three
years? [Five options]
36. How do you receive general news coverage? (Choose all that
apply) [Nine options]
37. What is your age? [Seven options]
38. What is your race? (Choose all that apply) [Seven options]
39. What is your current gender identity? (Choose all that apply)
[“Male”, “Female”, “Transgender”, “Gender nonconforming”,
“Intersex”, “Other”]
40. [If “other” chosen above] Please describe your gender identity
41. How do you describe your sexual identity? (Choose all that
apply) [“Lesbian”, “Gay”, “Bisexual”, “Queer”, “Heterosexual or
Straight”, “Other”]
42. [If “other” chosen above] Please describe your sexual identity
43. What is your zip code?
44. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
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[Seven options]
45. Including all sources, what do you estimate was your total
household income last year? [Fifteen options]
46. What is your relationship status? [“Single”, “In a committed
relationship”, “Commitment ceremony with no legal status”, “Civil
union or domestic partnership”, “Married with legal recognition”,
“Separated”, “Divorced”, “Widowed”, “Other”]
47. [If “other” chosen above] Please describe your relationship
status
48. Which of the following best describes your political views?
[“Very liberal”, “Liberal”, “Moderate”, “Conservative”, “Very
conservative”]

